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viAbstract:
One of the impacts of higher prices along with greater volatility in futures, basis
and spreads is that there is pressure for greater use of cash contracts for grain.  There
is a wide array of cash contracts with varying terms that pose major strategic
alternatives for buyers and the marketing system, particularly as buyers seek to use
contracting as an element of risk mitigation.  Durum is a crop where many of these
issues and challenges are apparent.  Durum is more risky than competing crops with
greater price, yield and quality risk.  And in contrast to competing crops, futures do not
exist, cross hedging is poor and forward contracting has been used minimally.
There are three purposes of this article: Provide a survey of contract terms used
in grain contracting with growers, illustrate some issues in contracting of some of the
specialty grains (durum) in the upper Midwest, and develop a model to analyze
alternative contracting strategies in the case of durum.  We introduce alternative pricing
features, and explore other alternatives and analyze them in terms of risk and return to
growers. 
viiGrain Contracting Strategies:  The Case of Durum Wheat
1
Introduction  
Markets for many components of grain prices have become more volatile in
recent years.  As a result of these and other reasons, there has been an escalation in
contracting which involves risk sharing between buyers and sellers.  This differs from
hedging in futures markets in which risk is transferred to an anonymous third party. 
One of the challenges in contracting is determining the appropriate risk premium
accrued by participants, and how that is shared between the buyer and seller.  The
other source of risk is contract non-performance or delivery (breach), which has evolved
as a major problem for buyers and the marketing system, particularly as buyers seek to
use contracting as an element of risk mitigation.  
Contracting is compounded by a number of factors.  One is the competition for
acres (or, commonly, the battle for acres).  The impact of this is for an escalation in the
use of pre-plant contracts, and use of contract terms that impact inter-crop and inter-firm
competition.  Second is that while standard terms exist in commodity type grain
contracts, contracting in this competitive environment has resulted in challenges
structuring contracts to be incentive compatible.  Third, if a contract is offered by a
buyer, it is done so in part as a means of risk mitigation by buyer (and seller). 
Consequently, if one party breaches, it abrogates the risk mitigation strategy of the
counter party.  Finally, and importantly, all buyers confront the business relationship
challenge of whether to initiate legal proceedings against farmers or suppliers who
knowingly breach their contract.  While there are differing views on this, it remains an
outstanding strategic issue.
2
Durum is a crop where many of these issues and challenges are applicable. 
Durum is more risky than competing crops.  There is greater price and yield risk as well
as quality risk.  And in contrast to competing crops, futures do not exist, cross hedging
is poor and forward contracting has been used minimally.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze problems of contract alternatives and
some of the issues confronting the grain industry related to contracting.  There are three
specific purposes.  First, we provide a broad survey of contract terms used in grain
contracting with growers.  Second, we illustrate some issues in contracting of some of
the specialty grains (durum) in the upper Midwest.  Finally, we develop a model to
analyze alternative contracting strategies in the case of durum wheat.  In this, we
introduce alternative pricing features, as well as explore other alternatives and analyze
them in terms of risk and return to growers. 
1 This is a comprehensive research report and shows relevant background data, analytical tools and
derivations.  A summary of this report is available entitled AAER???-S Grain Contracting Strategies:  The
Case of Durum Wheat and is available at http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/. 
2  See Wilson and Dahl (2010) for a detailed discussion.The paper is organized as follows.  First we describe volatility and risk and why
this provides a motive for the escalation in contracting.  Then we discuss what we
observe as growth in contracting for grains.  This includes a description of contract
terms and contract competition.  We illustrate some of the challenges, in this case as
applied to contracting for durum wheat.  Specifically, we develop a model to analyze
risks and returns for alternative durum contracting strategies.  These are used to
determine risk premiums for growers in order to induce them to choose durum versus
competing crops, in this case HRS wheat. 
Volatility
It is now common knowledge that there has been an escalation in volatility in
recent years.  While there may be debate about why or whether it will continue, all
market participants acknowledge that the escalation in volatility has increased risk in
grain marketing.
There are several points that are perhaps less recognized.  First, not only has
there been an escalation in volatility in the underlying futures markets, but there has
been an increase in volatility in several other elements of prices.  For example, the
basis in many markets has increased similarly (Figure 1, as an example).  In fact, for
wheat traded at the Minneapolis Grain Exchange (MGEX), the basis volatility has
increased sharply, and in some periods, it has been more volatile than the underlying
futures market price.  Taken together, this has reduced the hedging effectiveness of the
instrument (though it remains better than alternatives) and severely altered optimal
hedge ratios.  Similar observations exist at many other basis markets.  There has also
been a radical change in volatility in premiums/discounts in grains, as well as in shipping
costs, notably ocean rates, amongst rates for other modes.  Durum prices at
Minneapolis and the spread between durum and MGEX futures show increased
volatility from 2007 forward (Figures 2 and 3).  All of these have implications for buyers.
Given that these underlying fundamentals are expected to persist in future years,
it is expected that volatility will remain higher than in earlier years, albeit less than
observed in 2008.  More likely, this will persist for 4-8 years until new crop production
technologies are adopted and ultimately improve the dynamics of the supply/demand
balance.  Nevertheless, a primary reason buyers and sellers have been seeking, or
exploring, alternative contracting strategies is due in part to the reduced ability of
traditional mechanisms for controlling risks (notably futures which are more volatile, and
options which, as a result of the greater volatility results in higher premiums).
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Figure 2.  Monthly Minneapolis Hard Amber Durum Prices, June 1982-February
2009.
3Contracting for Grains
We discuss three topics related to contracting for grains.  One describes the
factors contributing to the apparent growth in contracting.  Second, we discuss the
battle for acres in particular, and the implications for contracting.  And, third, we present
a summary of some of the major clauses contained in grain contracts in the new
emerging contracting competition.
Growth in Contracting
The most recent broad based survey on contracting in agriculture (to our
knowledge) was done by MacDonald et al., (2004) who examined contracting of
commodities in the U.S. in 2001 and compared use of contracts to that in various time
periods.  They indicate that the number of farms using contracts and value of production
under contract increased from 1969 to 2001.  The number of farms using contracts
increased from 6% to 11% from 1969 to 2001 and the value of production increased
from 12% in 1969 to 36% in 2001.  They illustrate that the share of wheat under contract
increased from 6% of value in 1991-1993 to a high of 9% in 1996-1997 and declined to
5% in 2001.  Most of the contracting of crops was focused in fruit, vegetables, rice,
sugar beets, and peanuts.  Contracts in crops were largely marketing contracts, while









































































































































































































Figure 3.  Monthly Spread Between Minneapolis Hard Amber Durum Prices and
MGEX, HRS Futures, June 1982 to February 2009.
4MacDonald et al., (2004) conclude that the spot market is having difficulty
providing accurate price signals for products geared toward new consumer demands. 
They indicate that this trend for increased use of vertical coordination, through contracts
and ownership will continue.
More recently, it is our observation that contracting has escalated drastically. 
While it is difficult to document this without a broad-based survey, it is our observation
that for some commodities pre-plant contracting has been adopted for more than 70%
of industry demand, and has now become common business practice in the industry. 
We would attribute that this is in response to three important factors.  One is the battle
for acres.  The second is the apparent escalation in risk, as a result of the increase in
volatility as described above.  Third is the apparent deterioration of, or unavailability of,
traditional hedging mechanisms for managing risks (Wilson and Dahl, forthcoming).
Competition and the Battle for Acres:  Implications for Contracting
In part due to the growth in demands relative to supplies and shifts in agronomic
technology and production practices, a battle for acres exists in some regions of United
States agriculture.  While in some states there are few cropping opportunities and the
battle is not as apparent, in North Dakota, as an example, growers in many regions
have up to 12-18 different crops that can be grown.  In fact, extension budgets normally
contain returns for this many crops (Swenson et al).  Some elevators now post prices
for up to 12 crops at one time.  Finally, it should be noted, that in this state the crops are
apparently as diverse as any other state with the exception of California.
As a result of this, and the growth in GM row crops in non-traditional regions,
there has been a shift in production.  The response has been for an escalation in
contracting.  As examples, canola contracts have been offered with Act-of-God
(AOG)clauses for prescribed varieties, and some of the ethanol plants offered contracts
for 3 years production.  Most of the malting barley is now bought on pre-planting
contracts (Wilson, Gustafson and Dahl).  Some of these are one year contracts with an
option on the 2nd year, which are offered up to 14 months prior to harvest and there
have been relaxed quality requirements.  Most of the different types of sunflowers have
extensive contracting mechanisms.  There has been lesser contracting in durum wheat,
but pre-planting contracts were offered during 2007 for new crop (pre-planting) delivery
and during the 2008 contracting season, contracts were offered with a record premium
relative to HRS wheat.  And, many of the minor crops, including peas, edible beans,
Sunflower, NuSun, Vestive, etc. are all nearly 100% contracted.
Contract Terms
A contract is a mechanism of risk sharing.  Risks are pervasive including risks on
price, quality, quantity, acceptance rates, etc.  Hedging in futures contracts provide a
mechanism to share an element of “price” risk which is transferred to a 3rd party.  Thus,
5many contracts allow pricing relative to a “futures” price, essentially to allow for 3rd
party risk transfer.  Absent of futures component of pricing, risk is strictly shared
between buyer and seller.
The Figure below (Figure 4) is used to characterize the types of contracting now
used, as an alternative for procurement strategy (adapted from Wilson and Dahl, 2008). 
This highlights differences that may be embedded in different contract types.  It
illustrates the range of alternatives, from relying on simple spot transactions, to include
varying types of contracting, and finally, the alternative is always that of vertical
integration.  Ultimately, it is the buyer that chooses where to be strategically positioned
on this spectrum of alternatives.
To understand the scope and extent of contracting currently used in the upper
Midwest, we surveyed a group of buyers and processors of some of the non-commodity
type grains produced.  These would be considered as marketing contracts, as opposed
to production contracts (Michigan Farm Bureau, 2009) and these should not be
considered as specialty crops since at least in the past they had been considered as
commodities.  These are represented as crops which are not as readily tradable as the
major commodities such as corn, soybeans and winter wheat.  






























Figure 4.  Segregation, IP and Traceability: Spectrum of Procurement Strategies.
3 For obvious reasons it is not possible to disclose the firm names etc, but that is not important for
purposes here.
6Act-of-God  
Most of the contracts, though not all, contain Act-of-God (AOG) provisions. 
Sometimes these clauses are offered without a price differential.  Specific examples are
shown in Table 1 below.
AOG provisions are common across crops but, they are by no means
standardized.  There are many different interpretations of AOG clauses.  Those most
common are 1) a limit on the proportion of normal production or maximum contracted
volume that can be covered under AOG; 2) a price differential for AOG provisions; 3)
information requirements in order to verify yield losses which can include description of
location of field and/or crop insurance adjustment assessments; and 4) limitations on
specific location to apply for contract (requirement that contract applies only to crop
produced on specific field identified in the contract).  Specific crops may require specific
varieties for contracts, these include among others, malting barley and high oleic
sunflowers and canola.  AOG provisions may also involve the first right of refusal on
purchase of any volume exceeding the contracted volume.


















Barley 50 bu/a  Variety Specific
Anheuser
Busch













Sunflowers 2000 lbs/a Variety Specific SunPrairie
Canola
$0.50 -
$1.00/cwt 1000 lbs/a SunPrairie
High Oleic
Canola
$0.45/cwt 1000 lbs/a Variety Specific SunPrairie
7Pates indicates that for high oleic sunflowers, for 2009 Technology Crops
International Inc. is offering contracts with a premium of $3/cwt over NuSun prices or
growers would be allowed to price up to 25% of the crop on the Chicago Soybean
futures with the remainder at $2/cwt over NuSun prices (Pates, 2009).
Pricing Alternatives and Provisions  
Overview:  There are many types of pricing mechanisms.  These include, as
examples: Simple fixed price; Basis to single futures or multiple futures; 2-part pricing
(base quantity at contract price; Surplus at discount (reflecting implicit storage costs);
and in a number of contracts there are option type features (implicit) including Minimum
price and in some cases Min/max, Lookback options, and Average prices guaranteed
(equivalent to an Asian option).  While several of these are option based contracts, our
observation is that in practice, these pricing provisions do not include a price differential
to a fixed price contract and hence the buyer is absorbing the implicit cost of the option. 
Typically growers have the option to time the pricing decision. 
A set of contracts are proposed in the empirical analysis that would give growers
choices, and provide mechanisms to limit the exposure to price risk for the buyer. 
These include Fixed price, Spread (or basis) to MGEX futures, Minimum priced with
different floors and a Minimum/Maximum price contract.  Details of these are described
below.  These are motivated in part due to what appears to be evolutionary pressures. 
A fixed price contract is straight forward.  From a risk perspective, it involves the buyer
absorbing price risk that the seller is seeking to eliminate.  A spread contract is an
obvious alternative to a fixed price contract.  It is nearly identical to a basis contract and
importantly allows either the buyer or seller to individually transfer the futures portion of
their price risk to third parties through the hedging mechanism.
Alternatives involve varying types of option based contracts.  Even though there
are no futures on durum wheat, option type contracts can be developed with premiums
derived from the Black Option Pricing Model.  The difference is that here it is applied to
durum cash prices, instead of a more conventional futures traded contract.  These are
appealing in part that growers routinely suggest creating contracts with a floor price. 
However, floor price contracts, while attractive to growers, involve substantial risks to
the buyer, i.e., prices may increase which would adversely impact the buyer, but
favorably impact the grower.  An alternative is to offer a min/max contract which would
have the effect of being a risk sharing contract.  In this case, the buyer would provide a
floor price guarantee to growers; and, simultaneously, growers would be providing the
buyer a ceiling price guarantee.  Taken together, these comprise a risk sharing contract.
The spectrum of alternative contracts provide growers with more choices.  Those
contracts with less risk have value to growers—it allows them to lock in prices within an
acceptable range, determined in their contract choice.  These mechanisms would allow
the buyer better opportunities to control price risk.  Price differentials among these
choices are actuarially consistent and based on the Black option pricing model.  The
8buyer would be compensated for providing price guarantees (in terms of a lower
purchase price) and growers would have to decide among alternatives that are
actuarially sound.
Mechanics and Base Case Assumptions:  Mechanically, the price spread to MGEX HRS
futures, which addresses competing crop values, is the basis of the underlying value to
growers for all contracts.  A minimum price contract involves deducting a premium from
what the grower would otherwise receive.
4  A Min/Max price contract would be a form of
risk sharing contract:  the grower is guaranteed a floor; and buyer is guaranteed a
ceiling.  This spectrum of contracts instills the mechanisms for the buyer to reduce risk
substantially—should it decide prudent to pursue alternative price risk management
strategies.  Min/max contracts provide a natural hedge to both the buyer and seller in
that both a ceiling and floor prices is provided.  Price risks associated with other
contract types can be offset using varying offsetting positions in futures and/or options.
           For illustration, we use the general structure of contracts as described above. 






Spread Price Fixed spread relative to
MGEX futures on HRS
+200c/bu over
MGEX
Minimum Price 800 Price established by
deducting the option value of
the implied minimum
-64
Minimum Price 850 -89
Min/Max Price 800/900 Price established by
deducting the value of a put
option, and adding the value
of a call option
Net price
adjustment=+5
* Prices here are basis Minneapolis.  In practice and below, a deduction is used to establish a local price.
The spread contract would be a fixed spread relative to a defined MGEX futures
month, e.g., December.  The minimum price contract would provide a minimum price of
$8.00/bu (or $8.50/bu).  If prices exceed this price at some prescribed time, the grower
would receive the higher price.  A deduction would be made from the fixed price 
contract by the value of the premium as shown in the table.  If a higher minimum were
specified, it could be provided, but, at a greater discount (implied option premium) to the
grower.  Finally, a min/max contract as defined here is for a minimum price for durum at
4 Appendix A shows and describes the option premiums used here which are applied on cash durum
values.
9$8/bu, and a maximum at $9/bu.
5  Here, the net adjustment (e.g., the implied put and
call are 51 and 56c/bu respectively) is +5c/bu.  Implicitly, this means the grower would
be getting a higher net price, by 5c/bu which is ultimately due to the different values of
the puts and calls for this contract.
Finally, using these, local prices were derived by deducting 100 c/bu to represent
a typical grower price in western North Dakota.  These values are summarized in the
following figure that shows the price that would be expected by growers, and buyers,
under different contracts (Figure 5).  
The preferred contract obviously depends on whether the overall wheat market
increases or decreases.  Here, in addition to a fixed price and spread contract, there are
two minimum price contracts, $7.00 and $7.50/bu, and a min/max contract.  It is clear
here that a minimum contract is preferred if futures are expected to increase.  However,
a minimum price contract should have a greater discount that a min/max 
contract as illustrated in the table and figure above.
An important feature of the option based contracts is the deduction for the
premiums.  Deducting a premium to derive a minimum price contract is conventional.  In























































Figure 5.  Relationship Between Durum Local Price and MGEX Futures, by
Contract Alternative.  
5 Alternatively, a contract could be defined where there is a min/max provision for the spread, instead of
the price level.  These are not pursued at this time.
10option to the grower.  This means that offering a Minimum feature is a form of price
insurance.  However, it is risky for the buyer.  If provided free, growers would always
take it (i.e. free insurance).  For this reason, it is important to offer this as an alternative,
at a price differential.  Offering a higher minimum is of more value.  In practice, it is
important to reflect the “insurance value” of the minimum in contract price differentials. 
The Minimum’s can be chosen to reflect the cost of production and alternative
minimums can be offered easily.
The Min/max contract is a bit novel.  Here the buyer provides growers a
guarantee of a minimum (i.e. provides a put option to growers).  Simultaneously, the
grower provides the buyer a guarantee of a maximum price which would be equivalent
to a grower providing a call option to buyer.  For this reason, a Min/max contract can be
interpreted as risk sharing.  The differential between the value of the put and the call 
is applied to the contract price.  Here, the call has a slightly greater value than the put,
so, buyer would be paying a net premium to growers choosing this type of contract.
Simulation on Prices:
Since these are each derivative contracts (with exception of the fixed price
contract), their values depend on the outcomes of other variable(s).  To illustrate the
prospective characteristics of prices that may emerge for the alternative contracts, we
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12







































Figure 6.  Distribution of Resulting Price Distributions for Alternative Contracts,
Local Prices (North Dakota CRD 1), Acceptable Quality. 
11simulated these using monte-carlo methods.  Distributions that were used are described
below.  Local prices assumed at $1.00/bu spread relative to Minneapolis prices (i.e.,
Minneapolis HAD is $2.00 over MGEX HRS futures, and, prices in North Dakota are
assumed $1.00 under Minneapolis).
6  See Figure 6 and Table 2 for the results.
From a risk perspective (comparing the standard deviation), the minimum price
contracts have the greatest risk for both growers and the buyer.  This is, in part, due to
while the minimum prices reduce variability on the lower end of prices, volatility when
prices increase is retained.  Contracts with lesser risk (see the coefficients of variation in
Table 2) are the fixed price contract, followed by min/max which would have the 2nd
least risk amongst the alternatives; followed by the fixed spread contract.  Contracts
with lesser risk should be of greater value to both growers and the buyer; hence the
motivation to providing more alternatives.  Growers which are risk averse, should prefer
the latter contracts (fixed price and min/max).
Table 2.  Parameters for Input (Mpls) and Resulting Price Distributions for
Acceptable Quality (Local Prices).
Mean Std. Dev. Coef. of Var Minimum Maximum
Input Values
MGEX Futures 6.50 1.36 0.21 1.57 11.78
Minneapolis Hard Amber Durum 8.27 2.06 0.25 6.34 20.36
Resulting Price Distributions for Alternative Contracts (Local Prices)
Durum Fixed Price 7.50 0 0 7.50 7.50
Durum Fixed Spread 7.50 1.36 0.18 2.57 12.78
Durum Minimum 8.00 7.57 1.87 0.25 6.57 19.36
Durum Minimum 8.50 7.71 1.80 0.23 6.83 19.36
Durum Min/Max 7.34 0.42 0.06 7.05 8.05
Other Contract Terms:
Premiums and Discounts for Quality Deviations:  This is a very important provision. 
Barrett (2009) indicated that one of the top 10 contract points is to “Include provisions in
your contracts that spell out how, where and when quality discounts, and premiums are
to be determined.”  Some contracts treat quality deviations to apply at market values at
6 Distributions are presented in the data section.  
12harvest.  Others are premiums and discounts that are pre-specified in the contract prior
to planting.  At issue here is whether the buyer or seller absorbs the price risk of quality
deviations.
7
Right of First Refusal on Surplus Production:  This is a common clause and most buyers
will want this right.  At issue is at what price.  Some contracts provide this right at
market prices (as opposed to contract prices).  Others do so at some prescribed price
differential (at time of contracting).
Storage Options:  Most contracts require on-farm storage along with a buyers call. 
Storage fees following specified time and on-farm samples submitted.  However, some
require sampling and testing at delivery.  Contracts with on-farm storage options impose
risk on the farmer that grain quality will deteriorate and it is not covered by crop
insurance provisions, other than for potatoes, that have a separate storage rider.
Agronomics:  Finally, most contracts use certified seed bought from the buyer.  And, it is
common to declare or buyer recommends acres for specified production.
Risk and Contracting: Case Study on Durum Wheat
For illustration of issues related to risk and risk sharing, we show a detailed 
analysis of premiums that should be included in contracts for durum wheat.  This crop
has experienced problems similar to malting barley; in fact they are nearly identical. 
Traditionally, it has been a spot commodity and contracts were not used.  Basically,
supply exceeded demand and there was no need to contract.  Over time there has been
a decline in acres planted, ultimately to the point that the industry has had to rely more
on imports.  Reasons contributing to this include disease (i.e., vomitoxin), changing
agronomic competitiveness, a change in the geography of production and Canadian
competition.  The primary competing crops to both durum and malting barley are hard
red spring (HRS) wheat and canola, etc, in addition to soybeans, and up to 6-8 other
more specialty grains.  However, the difference between durum and malting barley has
been that durum acres have continued to decline in recent years, while malting barley
has increased in recent years, in part due to more assertive contracts. 
There is substantial risk in the production of durum.  These are primarily related
to price, quality and yield and all relative to the primary competing crop, in this case
HRS.  These are summarized in Table 3.  Specifically, price risk is more volatile than
HRS, and there is no public market for hedging, in contrast to HRS that can be readily
hedged.  There is limited (traditionally) transparency in forward contract values.  Yields
have similar risk.  Yield risk has increased in recent years in part due to the shift in
7  See Wilson and Dahl (2010) cite a recent legal dispute registered in Montana (Johnson) in which grain
was sold in a pre-harvest contract with post harvest price discounts specified. Upon delivery the buyer
allegedly applied different and more stringent discounts, no doubt reflecting the market in which the grain
was being sold. This illustrates the nature of issues about pre-harvest specification of post-harvest
discounts. 
13geography of production (i.e., it has shifted to regions more prone to drought).  Finally,
there is greater quality risk which is comprised of two parts.  One is the risk of not
conforming to No. 1 and 2 requirements (grade, falling numbers, protein, etc).  The
other is the discounts that would apply if rejected which are highly risky.  In addition,
there are slight differences in crop insurance provisions.
Table 3.  Elements of HRS and Durum Risks
HRS HAD



































Source: Based on distributions from the data described below (Table 4).
Methods to Evaluate Risks on Contracting:  Durum Wheat
Risk is a result of variability in yield, price, quality, and acceptance.  Stochastic
simulation is used to simulate payoffs for the alternative contracting strategies. 
Distributions of net returns are then compared using Stochastic Dominance with
Respect to a Function (SDRF) and Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function
(SERF) to determine risk efficient decisions and to examine effects of risk aversion on
preferences.
Contract Types
A base case was simulated to derive returns over direct costs for two HRS
alternatives; HRS Unpriced where prices were random and HRS hedged where a
portion of production is assumed hedged with futures with a hedge ratio of 1 and the
14remainder is random.  Then seven alternatives for durum; Durum Unpriced with prices
random and 6 with different price contracts on a fixed portion of expected production. 
The contracts were assumed to be limited to the first 20 bu/a of production with
remaining production prices random.  For contracts without AOG clauses, production
shortages require purchasing at random prices to fill out the contract.
There were six pricing provisions including:
1) Durum Fixed Price assumes a portion of expected durum production is sold on a
fixed price contract;
2) Durum Fixed Spread contract assumes a portion of expected durum production
is sold on a fixed spread over Minneapolis HRS futures.
3-4) Durum Minimum 8.00 and Durum Minimum 8.50 are minimum price contracts for
a portion of expected production, where contract prices reflect the maximum of
current random prices or a minimum price.  Minimums were $8.00/bu and
$8.50/bu Minneapolis reduced to a local price and reduced for a premium
reflecting the vanilla option value (see Appendix A) for a hypothetical option for
extending the minimum price contract.  Based on these, local values for minimum
values were $6.57/bu and $6.83/bu.
5)  Durum min/max was for a min/max contract alternative were a portion of
expected production was sold at a random value as long as it was between a
specified minimum and maximum range.  This was based on a Minneapolis price
reduced to a local price less the implied option value for the min/max contract. 
The minimum/maximum prices were $8-$9/bu Mpls, which translated to $7.05-
8.05/bu local prices.
6) Durum Fixed Price AOG was a fixed price contract with an AOG clause applied
on a portion of expected production.
The difference between 6 and 1 is the AOG clause contained in the latter.  Here, if
production did not meet contracted volumes, only the available production would have
to be delivered for sale at contract prices.
Mathematical Description of Model  
A payoff function is defined as net returns over variable cost per acre
8 or:  Πi=
gross revenue – direct costs for choice i, where i = 1...n, for each crops (HRS or
durum).  Returns are defined in Equations 1-3 for producers without a contract, with a
8 To be clear, this is not intended to depict a profit function which would in addition deduct costs such as
land and other fixed costs of production.  The implicit assumption is that these would be the same across
crops and hence their inclusion would not impact the results.
15contract without AOG provisions, and with a contract with AOG provisions, respectively:
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where:  E(Πi) is the expected net return per acre of crop i, Y is the yield (bu/a), Yc is the
volume contracted (bu/a), P1, and P2 are random local prices with no contract when
quality is met, and quality not met, P3 and P4 are local prices for contracted volumes
with quality met, and quality not met, respectively ($/bu) and may be fixed or random
based on the type of contract; indemnity payment is the value of the payoff if insurance
is collected on yield shortfalls; Ci is the direct cost of production for crop i and includes
seed, herbicides, fungicides, insecticides, fertilizers, fuel, repairs, interest and crop
insurance and is the same across strategies, but varies by crop (HRS vs durum). 
Quality acceptance risk is modeled using Öi which is a binary variable reflecting quality
which is drawn based on acceptance rates for the highest quality durum or hard red
spring.  The ˆ indicates the variable is random and a distribution is used for its value. 
Indirect costs such as land and taxes are excluded because they are fixed and constant
across crops and choices. 
Several sources of risk impact whether to contract.  Most important is the risk of
not being acceptable for the highest quality level.  The most frequent factors resulting in
not being acceptable would likely be durum color, test weight, sprout damage, vitreous
kernels and vomitoxin resulting in excess deoxynivalenol (DON).  Other risks are yields,
prices and discounts applied for not meeting specifications.
There are three steps in our analytical methodology.  First, we derive the Πi for
each alternative coverage level and contracting strategy.  Second, we use stochastic
simulation to iterate outcomes of Π for each crop and contract alternative.  Third,
Stochastic Efficiency with Respect to a Function (SERF) was applied using Simetar
(Richardson, Schumann, and Feldman, 2005) to estimate the certainty equivalents that
decision makers would place on a risky alternative relative to a no risk investment. 
Certainty equivalents are estimated across a range of Arrow-Pratt absolute risk aversion
coefficients and used to rank preferences across alternatives.  The range of absolute
risk aversion coefficients (ARAC) was from 0 to 0.117 where the upper bound for the
ARAC was estimated using McCarl and Bessler’s non-negativity certainty equivalent
approach.  Risk premiums were measured as the difference in certainty equivalents
relative to the HRS Hedged strategy.  The premium indicates the necessary change in
the certainty equivalent of net payoffs to equalize net returns across crop/contact
choices.  These can be used to infer ranks. 
16Data
Comparative crop budgets included direct costs for both durum and hard red
spring wheat production in Northwestern North Dakota for the 2009 crop year
(Swenson, 2008).  Direct costs included those for fertilizer, herbicides, insecticides,
seed, fuel, repairs, operating interest, and crop insurance and were representative of
northwestern North Dakota.  Random variables in the comparative crop budgets
included yields, prices, and crop quality discounts (Table 4).  Adjustments for insurance
payouts were included for crop yield shortfalls assuming 70% coverage for yields and
100% price level ($6.70 for HRS and $6.50 for durum, USDA-RMA).  Yield distributions
were fitted from annual data from 1995 to 2007 for crop reporting district 1 in Western
North Dakota from USDA-NASS.
Distributions for futures, protein premiums/discounts, and durum prices were
similarly fitted from annual data from 1995 to 2007 to determine variability, where
means of futures for HRS and cash prices for durum were adjusted to current levels for
September futures on 1/6/09 (7.06) and new crop bids for durum of (7.61).  Probability
of crop quality meeting specifications was determined from U.S. Hard Red Spring
Wheat (Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota) and U.S. Northern Grown
Durum Wheat (Montana, North Dakota) crop quality surveys from 1995 to 2007 which
indicated probability of meeting No. 1 HAD for durum or proportion 14% protein or
higher for HRS.  For HRS, if specifications were not met, the protein discount for 13%
protein wheat from 14% protein premium was applied.
For durum, if quality specifications are not met, a discount was applied for what is
referred as  terminal durum.  Determination of the discount applied is fairly problematic. 
There is limited historical data published on price spreads in the durum market.  The
best is that in Milling and Baking News.  These data show discounts for amber durum of
10 c/bu and for durum of 10-40 c/bu. where data from 2007 forward exhibit no variability
from these levels.  But upon discussion with traders, they indicate that in recent years
these discounts are much more random and much greater.  These discussions were the
basis to use the discount distribution that was applied.  Discounts were assumed to be
represented by a triangular distribution with minimum, most likely and maximum values
of 0, $1 and $4/bu, respectively.  This reflects the minimum, most likely and maximum
spreads between Minneapolis durum prices and prices received by growers in North
Dakota Northwest crop reporting region (North Dakota Agricultural Statistics Service)
after adjusting for a $1.00 transportation basis from local area to Minneapolis. 
Random draws for yields of HRS and durum are correlated (.81) and prices and
probabilities of meeting quality were correlated (Table 5).  For HRS, prices were
estimated from random draws for acceptable quality for delivery to both Minneapolis
and the Pacific Northwest.  Since northwestern North Dakota farmer prices can be
influenced by prices/demand at Minneapolis and the Pacific Northwest, the local price is 
17derived as the MAX[net returns selling to PNW, net returns selling to Mpls].  These are
used to determine returns over variable costs assuming recent shipping costs from
western North Dakota.
Table 4.  Distributions and Parameters for Random Elements in comparative
Crop Budgets.
Item Distribution Mean/Probability Std. Dev.
Yield HRS Logistic 29.43 2.41
Yield Durum Logistic 28.49 2.08
HRS Quality Discrete (1 or 0) .64 quality met
Durum Quality Discrete (1 or 0) .38 quality met
HRS Futures Normal 6.50 1.36
Mpls Durum Lognormal 8.43 2.83
Durum Discount
Quality not met
Triangular 0, $1, $4
HRS:  14% Protein
Premium Mpls
Lognormal .76 0.58







  HRS $111/a
  Durum $115/a
Bushels Contracted 20 bushels
















HRS Fut 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 0.00
14% Mpls 1.00 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66
14% PNW 1.00 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.00
13% Discount 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Durum 1.00 0.00 0.00
Quality HRS 1.00 0.00
Quality Durum 1.00
*0 = not statistically significant
18Simulation Methods
Alternative selling strategies were simulated 5000 iterations using @risk
(Palisade), at which time stopping criteria indicated results had settled so that
successive iterations would not result in a significant change in distribution parameters. 
Distributions for each of the selling alternatives were then evaluated using Simetar
(Schumann, Feldman, and Richardson, 2006) to estimate certainty equivalents for each
of the selling strategies across the range of relevant absolute risk aversion attitudes. 
The upper range for absolute risk aversions was determined following McCarl and
Bessler, 1989.  Risk premiums were derived as the difference in certainty equivalents
relative to a base strategy which here is assumed as growing HRS with a hedged
strategy.
Results
A base case was simulated of returns over direct costs for two HRS alternatives,
HRS Unpriced where prices were random, and HRS Hedged where a portion of
production (20 bu/a) is assumed hedged with futures with a hedge ratio of 1 and the
remainder is random.  Seven alternatives for durum, Durum Unpriced with prices
random and 6 alternatives with different price contracts on a fixed portion of expected
production (this was assumed to be limited to the first 20 bu/a of production with
remaining production prices random and for those without AOG clauses, production
shortages require purchasing at random prices to fill out the contract) as defined above.
Base Case
Distributions for returns over direct costs for each of the alternatives varied
across alternatives (Table 6).  Average returns were highest for the two HRS
alternatives, HRS Unpriced and HRS Hedged at $80/a.  For the durum alternatives,
Durum Unpriced had an average return of $63/a, while Durum Fixed Price, Fixed
Spread, and Fixed Price AOG contracts were higher averaging $67/a.  The durum
min/max strategy had slightly lower average returns of $64/a, while both of the minimum
contracts had the highest average returns of the durum contracts, averaging $69 and
$72/a for the Minimum 8.00 and Minimum 8.50 contracts, respectively.
Variability of returns over direct costs was lower for HRS (Hedged alternative
standard deviation = $34/a) and was much greater for the durum (unpriced standard
deviation = $74/a).  It is also high for the durum minimum contracts (standard deviation:
Minimum 8.00=$70/a and Minimum 8.50=$69/a).  The lowest variability of the durum
contracts was for the fixed price contracts with and without AOG, both with standard
deviations of $44/a.  Distributions for the alternatives also were positively skewed
toward more positive values and had kurtosis (distributions tended to be more spiked
than normal distribution).  Thus, more observations are clustered near the mean than
near the tails.  The implication of this is that more skewed alternatives would have a 
19higher probability of achieving a return greater than the mean and those with higher
kurtosis are more likely to be near the mean than those with lower kurtosis values.
Table 6.  Results for Simulated Distributions of Returns Over Direct Costs, by
Strategy.
  Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
HRS Unpriced 80 51 -52 366 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 80 34 1 366 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 63 74 -47 560 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 67 44 -30 364 1929 .73 4.25
Durum Fixed Spread 67 52 -76 346 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Minimum 8.00 69 70 -44 560 4909 1.75 7.61
Durum Minimum 8.50 72 69 -40 560 4720 1.79 7.86
Durum Min 8 Max 9 64 48 -39 375 2322 .81 4.20
Durum Fixed Price AOG 67 44 -30 364 1929 .73 4.25
Distributions for the alternatives were utilized to estimate certainty equivalents for
each of the alternatives for a range of grower risk attitudes ranging from risk neutral
(ARAC=0) to highly risk averse (ARAC=.117).  Ranking the alternatives by certainty
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Figure 7.  Distribution of Returns Over Direct Costs For HRS and Durum by
Alternative.
20equivalents show that risk neutral growers would prefer the HRS and HRS Hedged as
most preferred alternatives with all durum alternatives having lower certainty
equivalents (Top row in Table 7).  Of the durum alternatives, the two minimum price
contracts had the highest certainty equivalents, indicating these are the most preferred
durum alternatives for risk neutral growers.
For more risk averse growers (ARAC’s increase or as we move down the table),
the Durum Fixed Price without AOG quickly becomes the most preferred durum
contract, the Durum Fixed Price with AOG becomes the second preferred durum
contract, while the min/max contract becomes the third preferred durum alternative. 
These are followed by the two minimum price contracts (Minimum=$8.50) as fourth and
(Minimum=$8.00) fifth preferred durum alternatives.
Differences between certainty equivalents are the risk premium required for
growers to be indifferent between alternatives compared and reveal the degree of
preference of one alternative over another.  Risk premiums were derived relative to the
HRS hedge strategy (Table 8).  These show that for risk neutral growers, all of the
durum alternatives have negative risk premiums indicating they are less preferred to the
HRS hedge strategy.  Risk premiums for risk neutral growers for the durum alternatives
ranged from a low of $-8.35/a for Minimum $8.50 alternative to a high of $-17.24/a for
Durum Unpriced.  For example, risk neutral growers would require reductions in
variability and/or increases in returns that increase the certainty equivalent for the
Minimum $8.50 contract by $8.35/a before they would be indifferent between the
Minimum $8.50 contract and HRS Hedged.
For more risk averse growers, the risk premiums for durum alternatives relative
to the HRS Hedged strategy become more negative.  This indicates that more risk
averse growers would prefer HRS Hedged to the durum alternatives by larger values. 
The most risk averse growers would prefer HRS Hedged to Durum Fixed Price without
AOG by $28.28/a, Fixed Price with AOG by $28.32/a, Min/Max by $35.59/a, Minimum
$8.50 by $39.11/a, Minimum $8.00 by $43.15/a, Durum Unpriced by $53.74/a and
Durum Fixed Spread by $60.67/a.




















0 79.92 62.69 79.92 67.38 67.38 68.76 71.57 64.11 67.38
0.0049 73.83 51.53 77.19 62.91 61.11 58.74 61.93 58.78 62.90
0.0098 68.16 43.23 74.70 58.82 55.25 51.33 54.80 54.03 58.82
0.0146 62.85 36.61 72.38 55.07 49.72 45.42 49.11 49.74 55.06
0.0195 57.83 31.11 70.21 51.60 44.48 40.49 44.34 45.86 51.59
0.0244 53.09 26.40 68.17 48.39 39.51 36.25 40.22 42.33 48.38
0.0293 48.59 22.31 66.24 45.41 34.79 32.52 36.58 39.10 45.40
0.0341 44.34 18.70 64.41 42.65 30.32 29.20 33.34 36.14 42.64
0.0390 40.31 15.50 62.68 40.10 26.08 26.22 30.41 33.42 40.08
0.0439 36.51 12.64 61.02 37.72 22.06 23.52 27.75 30.91 37.69
0.0488 32.93 10.06 59.44 35.50 18.27 21.07 25.32 28.60 35.48
0.0536 29.57 7.73 57.94 33.44 14.69 18.82 23.09 26.46 33.41
0.0585 26.40 5.61 56.51 31.51 11.31 16.75 21.04 24.46 31.48
0.0634 23.43 3.68 55.14 29.71 8.12 14.85 19.13 22.61 29.67
0.0683 20.65 1.90 53.83 28.01 5.12 13.08 17.36 20.87 27.98
0.0731 18.04 0.27 52.58 26.42 2.28 11.43 15.70 19.24 26.38
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 51.39 24.91 (0.39) 9.89 14.15 17.71 24.87
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 50.25 23.48 (2.91) 8.45 12.69 16.26 23.44
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 49.16 22.13 (5.29) 7.10 11.32 14.89 22.09
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 48.11 20.84 (7.54) 5.83 10.02 13.59 20.81
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 47.12 19.62 (9.68) 4.62 8.79 12.35 19.58
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 46.16 18.45 (11.69) 3.48 7.61 11.17 18.41
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 45.25 17.34 (13.61) 2.39 6.50 10.04 17.30
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 44.37 16.27 (15.42) 1.36 5.43 8.97 16.23
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 43.53 15.24 (17.15) 0.38 4.41 7.93 15.21
22Table 8.  Risk Premiums for HRS and Durum Alternatives Relative to HRS Hedged



















0        0.00      (17.24)           -        (12.54)     (12.54)     (11.16)       (8.35)     (15.82)     (12.54)
0.0049       (3.36)     (25.66)           -        (14.29)     (16.08)     (18.46)     (15.26)     (18.42)     (14.29)
0.0098       (6.53)     (31.47)           -        (15.87)     (19.45)     (23.37)     (19.90)     (20.67)     (15.88)
0.0146       (9.53)     (35.77)           -        (17.31)     (22.66)     (26.95)     (23.27)     (22.63)     (17.32)
0.0195     (12.38)     (39.11)           -        (18.61)     (25.73)     (29.72)     (25.87)     (24.35)     (18.62)
0.0244     (15.08)     (41.77)           -        (19.78)     (28.66)     (31.92)     (27.95)     (25.84)     (19.79)
0.0293     (17.65)     (43.94)           -        (20.83)     (31.45)     (33.72)     (29.66)     (27.15)     (20.84)
0.0341     (20.08)     (45.71)           -        (21.76)     (34.10)     (35.21)     (31.08)     (28.28)     (21.77)
0.0390     (22.36)     (47.17)           -        (22.58)     (36.60)     (36.46)     (32.27)     (29.26)     (22.60)
0.0439     (24.51)     (48.38)           -        (23.30)     (38.96)     (37.50)     (33.27)     (30.11)     (23.33)
0.0488     (26.51)     (49.38)           -        (23.94)     (41.17)     (38.38)     (34.12)     (30.85)     (23.97)
0.0536     (28.38)     (50.21)           -        (24.50)     (43.25)     (39.12)     (34.85)     (31.49)     (24.53)
0.0585     (30.11)     (50.89)           -        (24.99)     (45.20)     (39.75)     (35.47)     (32.04)     (25.02)
0.0634     (31.70)     (51.46)           -        (25.43)     (47.02)     (40.29)     (36.01)     (32.53)     (25.46)
0.0683     (33.18)     (51.92)           -        (25.82)     (48.71)     (40.75)     (36.47)     (32.96)     (25.85)
0.0731     (34.54)     (52.31)           -        (26.17)     (50.30)     (41.15)     (36.88)     (33.34)     (26.20)
0.0780     (35.78)     (52.63)           -        (26.48)     (51.78)     (41.49)     (37.24)     (33.68)     (26.52)
0.0829     (36.93)     (52.89)           -        (26.76)     (53.16)     (41.79)     (37.55)     (33.99)     (26.80)
0.0878     (37.99)     (53.10)           -        (27.03)     (54.45)     (42.06)     (37.84)     (34.27)     (27.07)
0.0926     (38.96)     (53.27)           -        (27.27)     (55.66)     (42.29)     (38.10)     (34.53)     (27.31)
0.0975     (39.85)     (53.41)           -        (27.50)     (56.79)     (42.50)     (38.33)     (34.77)     (27.53)
0.1024     (40.67)     (53.52)           -        (27.71)     (57.85)     (42.68)     (38.55)     (34.99)     (27.75)
0.1073     (41.43)     (53.61)           -        (27.91)     (58.85)     (42.85)     (38.75)     (35.20)     (27.95)
0.1121     (42.13)     (53.68)           -        (28.10)     (59.79)     (43.01)     (38.93)     (35.40)     (28.14)
0.1170     (42.78)     (53.74)           -        (28.28)     (60.67)     (43.15)     (39.11)     (35.59)     (28.32)
These results indicate the value to growers of different pricing and AOG
provisions.  Here they are evaluated relative to growing HRS that is hedged.  Durum is
more risky as noted above.  For moderately risk averse growers (ARAC=.0293) results
indicate
1) A durum grower without any pricing provisions would prefer growing HRS
Hedged over durum by about $44/a. That is for growers to be indifferent between
Durum Unpriced and HRS Hedged, the certainty equivalent for unpriced durum
would have to increase by $44/a.  This would likely require some combination of
increased durum spot prices relative to HRS, increased probability of meeting
quality specifications, increased yields and/or reduced level of price discounts for
not meeting specifications, and/or reduced variability in durum prices, durum
discounts and yields;
2) A durum fixed price contract without AOG would be most valuable of the durum
contract alternatives, but would still be less preferred than HRS Hedged by
$21/a.  Very close would be a fixed price durum contract with AOG, which would
be less preferred than HRS Hedged by $21/a.  Hence, the value of the AOG
23provisions are virtually nil, or, as shown here are sightly negative.  In other
words, the value of eliminating effects of yield shortages are overwhelmed by
other effects (durum discounts, etc.);
3) Each of the remaining durum contracts are more risky and hence are less
valuable to a grower than the fixed price without AOG.  Interestingly, contracts
with minimum prices and/or min/max provisions and Durum Unpriced would have
greater value than a fixed spread contract;
4) The minimum price contracts limit the lower portions of the price distribution, but
retain higher prices to growers.  As such, these limit the negative variability of
prices, but retain the positive price moves.  Since the method utilized to estimate
certainty equivalents penalizes both positive and negative deviations of returns,
these contracts may be viewed less favorably than if analyzed with alternative
methods.  However, these types of contracts would also have to be viewed
favorably by agents extending the contracts who would view the retained positive
price variability as increased procurement cost risks.
Sensitivities
Sensitivities were conducted to evaluate changes in several parameters and
assumptions for individual contracts and across alternatives.  These include alternative
prices for fixed price with AOG provisions, alterative spreads for spread over MGEX
futures contract, alternative discounts for not meeting durum specifications, alternative
volumes contracted, different discounts for extension of AOG provisions, and analysis of
adding AOG provisions across contract types.
Alternative Fixed Prices with AOG: The base case alternative for fixed price contract
with AOG assumes prices are based on Minneapolis base price of $8.50 per bushel
with no discount.  Alternative fixed price contracts were modeled with prices ranging
from $8.50 to $10.50 in $0.50 increments.  
Increasing the fixed price by $0.50 per bushel increases average returns over
direct costs by about $10/a on average (Table 9) and also increased minimum and
maximum value of returns over direct costs by the same amount.  However the
standard deviation and other parameters of the distribution were not affected. 
Table 9.  Results for Durum Fixed Price with AOG for Alternative Base Prices.
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Durum Fixed Price AOG
No Discount $8.50 67.38 43.92 -29.58 364.08 1929 .73 4.25
Fixed Price $9.00 77.36 43.94 -19.58 374.08 1931 .73 4.25
Fixed Price $9.50  87.35 43.97 -9.58 384.08 1933 .73 4.25
Fixed Price $10.00 97.33 43.99 0.42 394.08 1935 .73 4.24
Fixed Price $10.50 107.31 44.02 10.42 404.08 1937 .72 4.24
24Stochastic efficiency analysis of the distribution of returns over direct costs for
alternative fixed price levels shows that certainty equivalents increased by nearly $10/a
for each $0.50 increase in fixed price.  This increase in certainty equivalents  with an
increase in fixed prices was consistent across the range of risk attitudes from risk
neutral to highly risk averse growers (Appendix Table B1).
Comparison of risk premiums relative to HRS hedged for the various fixed price
alternatives suggests risk neutral growers would start to prefer the Durum Fixed Price
with AOG contract over the HRS hedged when fixed prices are $1/bu higher than the
base case.  The base case assumed Minneapolis durum prices at $2/bu over HRS
futures, so, the additional $1/bu premium implies a total premium of $3/bu over HRS
futures.  At this spread, risk neutral growers would prefer the fixed price contract by
$7.42/a over HRS Hedged.  More risk averse would prefer HRS Hedged over the fixed
price contract at $9.50 Minneapolis.  If the fixed price contract is further increased to
$10.00 Minneapolis, then growers across all risk attitudes would prefer the durum fixed
price contract over HRS Hedged.  Preferences for the $10.00 Minneapolis fixed price
would range from $17.41/a for risk neutral growers to $1.28/a for highly risk averse
growers (Appendix Table B2).  
This indicates that to offset the added risk in durum production, the fixed price
contract would have to increase by $1 to $1.50/bu over the base case for growers to be
indifferent or prefer the fixed price over HRS Hedged.  The durum price of $9.50 to
$10/bu at Minneapolis and base futures price at $6.50/bu implies a fixed price at $3.00
to $3.50 over Minneapolis futures.
Alternative Spreads for Fixed Spread Contract:  In the base case, the fixed spread
assumed over MGEX futures was $2/bu.  The range for the spread historically has
ranged from trading under MGEX to over $5/bu over.  The sensitivity of the fixed spread
contract for durum relative to MGEX futures was evaluated for a range of spreads
ranging from $0/bu to $5/bu over MGEX Futures in $1 increments (Figure 8).  ......
Levels for the durum Fixed Spread over MGEX Futures were compared to the
durum fixed spread without AOG contract.  Increasing the spread over MGEX increases
the average return over direct costs, but has no effect on the variability of the
distribution of returns (Table 10).  Under the increments in spread, it is notable that the
fixed price without AOG, has the lower portions of the distribution of returns rotated
rightward relative to the fixed spread contracts over MGEX futures (Figure 8).  This is
also reflected in the higher standard deviations for the spread contracts ($51.64/a) vs.
the fixed price contract ($43.92/a).
Since the lower portions of the distribution of the alternative spread contracts is
rotated relative to the fixed price contracts, comparisons of certainty equivalents and
risk premiums relative to HRS Hedged between the two contracts yields different results
(Appendix Tables B3-4).   For each level of spread, preferences relative to HRS Hedged
have their highest values for risk neutral growers and become larger negative values as
25risk aversion increases.  At a spread of $3/bu, the fixed spread contract becomes
preferred to HRS Hedged for the risk neutral and slightly risk averse, but quickly
becomes negative as risk aversion increases.  At a spread of $5 over MGEX futures,
Durum Fixed Spread is preferred to HRS Hedged for all risk attitudes except for the
most risk averse.  The level of preference for risk neutral growers for spreads of $3, $4,
and $5/bu were $7.46/a, $27.46/a, and $47.46/a, respectively.
Table 10.  Results for Returns over Direct Costs for Selected HRS and Durum
Alternatives and Durum Fixed Spread by Level of Spread
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52 366 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 34.27 1 366 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -47 560 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 67.38 43.92 -30 364 1929 .73 4.25
Durum Fixed Spread $0 27.38 51.64 -116 306 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Fixed Spread $1  47.38 51.64 -96 326 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Fixed Spread $2  67.38 51.64 -76 346 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Fixed Spread $3 87.38 51.64 -56 366 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Fixed Spread $4 107.38 51.64 -36 386 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Fixed Spread $5 127.38 51.64 -16 406 2667 .46 3.63
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Figure 8.  Distribution of Returns over Direct Costs for Durum Fixed Price without
AOG and Durum Fixed Spread over MGEX Futures by Level of Spread.
26Discounts for Durum Not Meeting Quality Specifications:  The base case assumes
durum not meeting quality specifications is discounted.  The discount levels are
assumed represented by a triangular distribution with minimum, most likely and
maximum values of $0, $1, and $4/bu, respectively.  Post-harvest discounts for durum
are risky, non-transparent and about 62% of the crop does not conform to No. 1 HAD on
average.  Hence, this is a critical factor impacting returns and risk.  Two alternative
sensitivities were compared including 1) lower mean with lower variability (Triangular
($0, $0.50, $1.25/bu)) and 2) higher level of discount with same range of variability
(Triangular ($0, $2, $4/bu)).
Changes in the durum discount distributions resulted in changes in the mean and
standard deviations of returns for the contract alternatives.  Lowering the mean and
variability of durum discounts increased average returns over direct costs by about
$19/a and lowered standard deviations by about $8-$10/a.  Increasing the most likely
value of durum discounts lowered average returns over direct cost by about $5/a and
increased standard deviations of returns by about $2/a (Table 11).
Changes in the durum discount distributions had impacts on the certainty
equivalents and risk premiums relative to HRS Hedged (Figure 9, Appendix Tables B5-
8).  Lowering the mean and variability of durum discounts allows durum contracting
alternatives to become preferred to HRS Hedged for risk neutral to highly risk averse
growers.  For risk neutral growers, the Minimum $8.50 is most preferred alternative.  As
growers become slightly risk averse, the durum fixed price with and without AOG
provisions become the first and second preferred alternatives and the HRS Hedged
strategy is quickly preferred to the Minimum $8.50 contract.  The fixed price alternatives
are preferred to the HRS Hedged strategy by $6-8/a across the range of risk attitudes
with the AOG provisions being preferred over no AOG by the most risk averse growers
by about $0.51/a.  These results indicate that durum contracting, primarily the durum
fixed price with and without AOG can provide value to growers if the level and variability
of durum discounts was reduced.
If the most likely value of durum discounts were increased, risk premiums
become more negative by $4-6/a for all the durum alternatives.  Thus, increasing the
most likely level of durum discounts just makes growers less likely to plant durum as it
increases the preference for HRS Hedged over all the durum alternatives by $4-6/a. 
This reflects the large impact of durum discounts on growers preferences which is
consistent across all risk attitudes of growers.
27Table 11.  Results for Alternative Distributions for Durum Discounts when Not
Meeting Specifications by Contract Alternative
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
Base Case: Triangular (0,.1,4) 
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 34.27 0.67 365.91 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 67.38 43.92 -29.58 364.08 1929 .73 4.25
Durum Fixed Spread 67.38 51.64 -76.04 346.06 2667 .46 3.63
Durum Minimum 8.00 68.76 70.06 -43.97 559.74 4909 1.75 7.61
Durum Minimum 8.50 71.57 68.70 -39.98 559.74 4720 1.79 7.86
Durum Min 8 Max 9 64.11 48.18 -38.58 375.08 2322 .81 4.20
Durum Fixed Price AOG 67.38 43.92 -29.58 364.08 1929 .73 4.25
Triangular (0,.50,1.25)
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 34.27 0.67 365.91 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 81.42 66.55 -16.29 559.74 4428 2.00 8.65
Durum Fixed Price 86.11 34.39 1.99 364.08 1183 1.30 6.96
Durum Fixed Spread 86.11 43.68 -52.93 346.07 1908 .67 4.46
Durum Minimum 8.00 87.50 62.84 -2.21 559.74 3949 2.22 9.80
Durum Minimum 8.50 90.30 61.46 2.99 559.74 3777 2.29 12.24
Durum Min 8 Max 9 82.84 39.04 7.39 375.08 1524 1.31 6.22
Durum Fixed Price AOG 86.11 34.39 13.78 364.08 1183 1.30 6.96
Triangular (0,2,4)
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 34.27 0.67 365.91 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 57.44 75.58 -51.81 559.74 5713 1.59 6.73
Durum Fixed Price 62.13 45.98 -33.01 364.08 2115 .79 4.08
Durum Fixed Spread 62.13 53.26 -85.00 346.07 2837 .53 3.57
Durum Minimum 8.00 63.51 71.97 -48.68 559.74 5180 1.72 7.39
Durum Minimum 8.50 66.32 70.62 -46.41 559.74 4988 1.76 7.62
Durum Min 8 Max 9 58.85 50.24 -42.01 375.08 2524 .85 4.06
Durum Fixed Price AOG 62.13 45.99 -33.01 364.08 2115 .79 4.08
28Volume of Crop Contracted:  The base case alternatives assume 20 bushels/a are
contracted in each of the alternatives vs. an average yield of 28.5 bushels/a
(approximately 70% of expected production).  Higher and lower levels of expected
production were examined to determine the effect on rankings between alternatives
which ranged from 10 to 28.5 bushels/a (35% to 100% of expected production).
Changing the volume of crop contracted has limited impact on the average return
over direct costs for all the alternatives.  The exception is for the two minimum price
contracts which increased in value as the volume of bushels contracted increased. 
However, standard deviations for most of the alternatives exhibited the pattern of
decreasing variability as the volume contracted increases from 10 bushels/a to 28.5
bushels/a contracted or 100% of expected production (Table 12).   The skewness of the
durum contracting alternatives declined as the volume of bushels contracted increased
for all but the two minimum contracts, which increased in skewness.  This indicates that
as more bushels were contracted, distributions for most of the durum contracts became
more symmetrical, except for the two minimum contracts which became more skewed
toward higher positive values (Figure 10).
Analyzing the alternative contracting strategies for the different volumes
contracted shows that all the durum contracts are less preferred that HRS Hedged
across all bushel volumes contracted up to 100 percent of expected production.  The
ranking of preference among the durum contracts and the amount of preference (risk
premium) relative to HRS Hedged varied by the level of bushels contracted and the risk































































Figure 9.  Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged with Lower Variability in Durum
Discounts (Triangular ($0, $0.50, $1.25)). 
29attitude of the grower (Appendix Tables B9-B16).  For risk neutral growers, the
Minimum 8.50 contract was the most preferred of the durum contracts for all bushel
levels contracted.  However, once growers shift from risk neutral to even very slightly
risk averse, the Durum Fixed Price became the highest ranked of the durum contract
alternatives.  For the 10-20 bushel contract volumes, the Durum Fixed Price with and
without AOG provisions were nearly identical.  However, once volumes contracted
reached 25 to 28.5 bushels/a, at risk attitudes of about .03 to .02, growers preferred the
fixed price with AOG provisions over without.  For the 28.5 bushels contracted, this
degree of preference increased so that for the most risk averse growers, they would
prefer HRS Hedged over Durum Fixed Price with AOG by $18.44/a, but over Durum
Fixed Price without AOG by $30.81/a, indicating that at higher bushel levels contracted,
the AOG provisions would be valued at up to $12.37/a.  However, for the most risk
averse growers contracting 25 bushels/a, the value of the AOG provisions would only
be $0.98/a.
Risk premiums for Durum Fixed Price without AOG relative to HRS Hedged by
contracted bushels were compared by risk attitude of the grower (Figure 11).  These
show the effect of contracted bushels on the level of preference for HRS Hedged over
Durum Fixed Price varies by the risk attitude of the grower.  Here the contracted bushel
alternative with the highest risk premium relative to HRS Hedged changes as the risk
attitude of the grower changes.  This indicates that growers using a fixed price contract
would prefer to contract different levels of expected production depending on their level
of risk aversion.  For example, growers that are risk neutral to ARACs of near .05, would
prefer contracting 100 percent of expected production over lesser bushel volumes. 
Those with higher risk aversions would prefer contracting 25 bushels per acre, while the
most risk averse growers would prefer only contracting 10 bushels/a. 
30 Table 12.  Results for Alternative Bushel Volumes Contracted by Contract
Alternative
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
10 Bushels/A Contracted
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 41.26 -15.19 366.09 1703 .75 4.33
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 65.03 57.06 -35.27 461.91 3255 1.26 5.79
Durum Fixed Spread 65.03 58.65 -52.86 452.91 3440 1.17 5.55
Durum Minimum 8.00 65.73 71.81 -43.97 559.74 5156 1.69 7.26
Durum Minimum 8.50 67.13 71.08 -41.97 559.74 5053 1.71 7.39
Durum Min 8 Max 9 63.40 59.79 -39.77 467.41 3575 1.25 5.56
Durum Fixed Price AOG 65.03 57.06 -35.27 461.91 3255 1.26 5.79
15 Bushels/A Contracted
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 37.31 0.61 366.00 1392 .87 4.82
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 66.21 49.86 -32.05 413.00 2486 1.01 5.06
Durum Fixed Spread 66.21 53.86 -32.01 399.49 2901 .82 4.55
Durum Minimum 8.00 67.24 70.92 -43.97 559.74 5029 1.72 7.44
Durum Minimum 8.50 69.35 69.86 -40.98 559.74 4881 1.75 7.63
Durum Min 8 Max 9 63.75 53.60 -38.80 421.25 2873 1.03 4.86
Durum Fixed Price AOG 66.21 49.86 -32.05 413.00 2486 1.01 5.06
25 Bushels/A Contracted
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 32.38 -8.98 365.82 1049 .89 5.79
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 68.55 39.81 -36.39 315.17 1584 .43 3.52
Durum Fixed Spread 68.56 52.32 -105.66 292.66 2737 .19 3.12
Durum Minimum 8.00 70.28 69.25 -43.97 559.74 4796 1.78 7.78
Durum Minimum 8.50 73.79 67.61 -39.46 559.74 4571 1.83 8.09
Durum Min 8 Max 9 64.46 43.84 -38.35 328.92 1922 .60 3.65
Durum Fixed Price AOG 68.53 39.82 -28.81 315.17 1585 .44 3.52
28.5 Bushels/A Contracted
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 31.87 -19.07 365.76 1016 .78 5.88
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price 69.38 38.34 -55.18 280.93 1470 .21 3.26
Durum Fixed Spread 69.38 54.47 -126.40 257.47 2967 .07 3.00
Durum Minimum 8.00 71.35 68.71 -43.97 559.74 4721 1.80 7.89
Durum Minimum 8.50 75.34 66.88 -39.46 559.74 4473 1.85 8.23
Durum Min 8 Max 9 64.71 41.61 -39.50 296.60 1732 .46 3.37
Durum Fixed Price AOG 69.16 38.33 -28.81 280.93 1469 .26 3.14
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Figure 10.  Distributions for Returns Over Direct Costs for HRS and Durum
Alternatives, by Bushels Contracted.
32The same comparison using the durum fixed price with the AOG is shown in Figure 12. 
Here, contracting 28.5 bushels/a or 100 percent of expected production is the preferred
bushel contracting level across the range of risk attitudes from risk neutral to the most
risk averse growers.   
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Figure 11.  Risk Premiums for Durum Fixed Price without AOG Relative to HRS
Hedged, by Level of Bushels Contracted and Risk Attitude of Grower.
33          Discounts for AOG Provisions in Fixed Price Contract:  The fixed price contract
with AOG for the base case assumes no discount in prices for the AOG provisions (or
no price differential).  However, most crop contracts with AOG clauses have some level
of discount applied relative to a contract without the AOG.  Alternative scenarios for the
fixed price contract with AOG were evaluated with discounts for AOG provisions in
$0.25 increments from $0 to $1.00/bu.  
Increasing the discount reduces the average, minimum and maximum returns
over direct costs by about $5.00/a, but has little to no impact on variability or shape of
the distribution of returns (Table 13).  This in effect shifts the distribution leftward (lower
levels of returns occurring for a given probability) by $5.00/a for each $0.25 increase in
the discount for the AOG clause (Figure 13).
As the AOG discount increases, the certainty equivalents for the durum fixed
price contract decline (Appendix Table B17).  For risk neutral growers, the increase in
discounts to $0.25 shifts the fixed price AOG alternative to the last ranked alternative
from the seventh with no discount (Appendix Tables B17-18).  Further, as growers
become more risk averse, with no discount, the durum fixed price with AOG alternative
quickly becomes the third best alternative behind HRS Hedged and Durum Fixed Price
without AOG.  For any level of risk aversion, as the level of discount increases, growers
rank the Durum Fixed Price with  AOG as a worse alternative.  As growers become
more risk averse, the rankings for any level of discount improve so that for the most risk
averse growers, the durum fixed price with AOG is ranked as the third best alternative
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Figure 12.  Risk Premiums for Durum Fixed Price with AOG Relative to HRS
Hedged, by Level of Bushels Contracted and Risk Attitude of Grower.
34for discounts from 0-$.25/bu, fourth for a discount of $0.50/bu to the seventh best
alternative for discounts ranging from $0.75 to $1.00/bu.  
Interestingly, the durum fixed price with AOG for all levels of discounts ranging
from $0 to $1.00/bu result in certainty equivalents that are lower than for the durum
fixed price without AOG provisions (Appendix Table B17).  This suggests that with the
current variability impacting durum returns, AOG provisions do not provide value to
growers for the fixed price contract.
Table 13.  Results for Durum Fixed Price with AOG by Level of Price Discount
Applied for AOG Provisions.
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
AOG Discounts
Durum Fixed Price with
No Discount 67.38 43.92 -29.58 364.08 1929 .73 4.25
Discount $-0.25/bu 62.39 43.91 -34.58 359.08 1928 .73 4.25
Discount $-0.50/bu 57.40 43.90 -39.58 354.08 1927 .73 4.26
Discount $-0.75/bu 52.41 43.89 -44.58 349.08 1926 .73 4.26
Discount $-1.00/bu 47.42 43.88 -49.58 344.08 1925 .74 4.26
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Figure 13.  Distribution of Returns Over Direct Costs for HAD Fixed Price with
AOG, by Level of Price Discount Applied for AOG Provisions.
35Value of AOG Clause by Contract:  Each of the durum contracts were modeled both
with an AOG clause and without where no discount was applied for the AOG provisions. 
This allows estimation of the implied value to growers (how much they would be willing
to pay) for the AOG provisions.   Resulting distributions with (Table 5) and without
(Table 14) AOG clauses were very similar.  Stochastic efficiency analysis of
distributions indicates that AOG clauses change in value as the risk attitude of growers
becomes more risk averse (Appendix Tables B19-20).  For the fixed spread contract,
the difference between certainty equivalents with AOG provisions and base case
(without AOG) indicate that AOG provides positive value to growers which increase up
to 18 c/a for the most risk averse growers.  In contrast, the AOG value for the remaining
contracts is negative and declines (becomes more negative) as growers become more
risk averse (Figure 14).  This suggests that the value of AOG provisions varies widely
by the type of durum contract advanced and the risk attitude of the grower  and for most
contracts provides limited value to durum growers under the current assumptions.
Table 14.  Results for simulated distributions of returns over variable costs by
strategy with AOG clauses in all durum contracts
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Variance Skewness Kurtosis
HRS Unpriced 79.92 51.00 -52.49 366.27 2601 .51 3.70
HRS Hedged 79.92 34.27 0.67 365.91 1174 .94 5.36
Durum Unpriced 62.69 73.70 -46.53 559.74 5432 1.61 6.89
Durum Fixed Price AOG 67.38 43.92 -29.58 364.08 1929 .73 4.25
Durum Fixed Spread
AOG 67.38 51.62 -76.04 346.07 2665 .46 3.63
Durum Minimum 8.00
AOG 68.75 70.08 -43.97 559.74 4911 1.75 7.61
Durum Minimum 8.50
AOG 71.55 68.72 -39.98 559.74 4722 1.79 7.86
Durum Min 8 Max 9 AOG 64.11 48.19 -35.58 375.08 2322 .81 4.20
36Summary/Implications
There has been growth in the use of pre-plant contracts for many important
agricultural contracts.  Factors that have contributed to this include the increase in
volatility in all aspects of commodity trading and the battle for acres resulting in intense
inter-crop competition.  
Durum is a crop that has experienced many problems that result in greater risk
for both buyers and sellers.  Its acreage has decreased substantially in recent years
(from about 4 million acres in 2000 to 2.6 million acres in 2009).  As a result, buyers
have become increasingly more dependent on imports, as well as production from non-
traditional regions as sources of supply.  There also is greater price risk, spread risk,
and there is no futures contract in comparison to HRS which is the principal competing
crop.  Finally, quality risk is greater, and discounts that would apply to non-conforming
production are greater and have greater variability relative to those that would apply to
HRS.  For all these reasons, there is more pressure for buyers and sellers of durum to
explore use of pre-plant contracts as a means to reduce risk for both buyers and sellers. 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze contract alternatives and some of the
issues confronting the grain industry related to contracting.  There are three specific
purposes.  First, we provide a broad survey of contract terms used in grain contracting
with growers.  Second, we illustrate some issues in contracting of some of the specialty 
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Figure 14.  Comparison of Risk Premium for AOG provisions, by Contract and
Risk Attitude.
37grains (durum) in the upper Midwest.   Finally, we develop a model to analyze
a l t e r n a t i v e  c o n t r a c t i n g  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  d u r u m  w h e a t .   ..................
A range of contract alternatives for durum were posed and compared to unpriced
durum, HRS and hedged HRS for northwestern North Dakota.  Returns over direct
costs were simulated and resulting distributions were compared using stochastic
efficiency techniques to determine certainty equivalents and rank preferences for each
alternative.  Risk premiums relative to HRS Hedged strategy were estimated across a
range of risk aversions for growers.  Sensitivities were conducted on specific contract
provisions (spread for fixed price, size of fixed spread over MGEX, alternative
distributions for durum discounts, volume contracted, discount for AOG contract, etc.) to
determine their effect on certainty equivalents and grower rankings of alternatives.  
Results indicated that unpriced durum has a high degree of risk in returns relative
to either HRS unpriced or HRS hedged (standard deviations of $74/a, $51/a, and $34/a,
respectively).  This is caused by numerous factors but, of particular importance, are the
greater price and quality risks for durum versus HRS.  The proposed durum contract
alternatives reduce some of the variability in returns, especially the durum fixed price
(with and without AOG), min/max and fixed spread contracts.  The durum minimum
price contracts increased average returns over the other durum alternatives by limiting
the effects of lower prices, but the reduction in variability was much less than the other
alternatives.
Stochastic efficiency analysis indicates that risk neutral to highly risk averse
growers would prefer HRS Hedged over the alternative durum contracts.  Thus, while
the durum contracts (primarily the fixed price with and without AOG provisions) reduced
variability of returns, they provide less value to growers and are less preferred than
HRS Hedged.  Thus, for durum contracting alternatives to become preferred by
growers, it would require some combination of reductions in the level and variability of
durum discounts for not meeting quality specifications, higher levels and reduced
variability in prices, yields, or probability of meeting specifications.  Since the probability
of achieving increased yields and/or reduced variability of yields of durum relative to
HRS varieties are limited, this suggests that contracts should focus on discounts for not
meeting specifications, specification limits and controlling for levels and variability of
Minneapolis durum prices.  
Specific results for moderately risk averse growers (ARAC=.0293) indicate:
1) A durum grower without any pricing provisions would prefer growing HRS
Hedged over durum by about $44/a.  That is, for growers to be indifferent
between durum unpriced and HRS Hedged, the certainty equivalent for unpriced
durum would have to increase by $44/a.  This would likely require some
combination of increased durum spot prices relative to HRS, increased
probability of meeting quality specifications, increased yields and/or reduced level
of price discounts for not meeting specifications, and/or reduced variability in
durum prices, durum discounts and yields.
382) A durum fixed price contract without AOG would be most valuable of the durum
contract alternatives, but would still be less preferred than HRS Hedged by
$21/a.  Very close would be a fixed price durum contract with AOG, which would
be less preferred than HRS Hedged by $21/a.  Hence, the value of the AOG
provisions are virtually nil, or as shown here, are sightly negative.  In other
words, the value of eliminating effects of yield shortages are overwhelmed by
other effects (durum discounts, etc.).
3) Each of the remaining durum contracts are more risky and hence are less
valuable to a grower than the fixed price without AOG.  Interestingly, contracts
with minimum prices and/or min/max provisions and durum unpriced would have
greater value than a fixed spread contract.
4) The minimum price contracts limit the lower portions of the price distribution, but
retain higher prices to growers.  As such, these limit the negative variability of
prices, but retain the positive price moves.  Since the method utilized to estimate
certainty equivalents penalizes both positive and negative deviations of returns,
these contracts may be viewed less favorably than if analyzed with alternative
methods.  However, these types of contracts would also have to be viewed
favorably by agents extending the contracts who would view the retained positive
price variability as increased procurement cost risks.
There are numerous implications from these results for buyers.  Most important is
that durum is more risky than competing crops.  For slightly risk averse growers, having
the ability to utilize a fixed price contract rather than growing durum unpriced, reduces
the risk premium the grower would require to be indifferent between planting durum and
HRS Hedged from $44/a to $21/a.  Thus, for producers to prefer or be indifferent
between planting durum and HRS Hedged would likely require some combination of
increased durum spot/contract/spread prices relative to HRS, increased probability of
meeting quality specifications, increased yields and/or reduced level of price discounts
for not meeting specifications, and/or reduced variability in durum prices.  In the case of
the fixed price contract, increasing the fixed price by $1/bu to $1.50/bu results in
growers becoming indifferent between durum and HRS Hedged.  In the fixed spread
contract, the spread would have to be $3/bu to $5/bu over MGEX futures (depending on
risk aversion of the grower with higher values required for the more risk averse growers)
for growers to be indifferent between durum and HRS Hedged.  Reducing the range of
durum discounts from $0 to $4/bu to $0 to $1.25/bu results in the durum fixed price
contract with and without AOG and the Min/Max being preferred to HRS Hedged.
From a buyer perspective, the ability to reduce the risk of growing unpriced
durum by offering a fixed price contract should increase the likelihood that growers at
the margin could plant durum.  In the model developed here, growers are evaluated
using distributions for yields, meeting quality specification, etc for the marketing region
as a whole.  Distributions for individual growers within the marketing region may vary
from those for the region as a whole.  Thus, the ability to offer the contract may, at the
margin, influence some portion of growers with different distributions for yields,
39probability of acceptable quality, etc., who prior to the contract preferred to grow HRS
Hedged, to be indifferent to or prefer planting durum with the fixed price contract.  
Finally, there are many types of contract provisions that can be included in
contracts.  These include numerous different pricing provisions (as illustrated here, up
to 6 pricing formulae could be envisioned for durum), AOG, etc. as well as provisions
covering the value of post-harvest price discounts for excess production.  As it turns out
the latter is particularly interesting and important since it has a significant impact on risk. 
These results indicate that all of these impact the value of contracts and should be
carefully analyzed by principals and growers as they envision alternative contracting
strategies.
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41Appendix A:  Vanilla Options for Durum Wheat
9
Traditional exchange traded options are on futures contracts and include
American if early exercise is allowed or European if it allows exercise only at maturity.  If
the option places a floor on the price it is called a “put” option.  If the option places a
ceiling on the price it is called a “call” option.  
Other types of options exist and are used often for non-exchange traded
instruments.  These include Vanilla and Asian options.  Vanilla options are options that
settle to a single spot price.  It is similar to the American and European options, but,
these have strike prices.  Vanilla options settle to a single price on a single date (e.g.,
last day of the month).  Asian options are an option that settles to an average price over
a particular time period.  The type of implied option depends on two factors:  Whether
the contract settles to a single spot price or an average price over a specified time
period; and whether the option places a ceiling or floor (or both) on the contract price.
The values illustrated in this report were derived analytically and should reflect
what would be the value of an option if traded.  The values were derived using using the
Black options pricing model (BOPM).  The necessary inputs are volatility, min and max
values, the time to expiration and interest costs.  Outputs are prices for premiums for
puts and calls for all months forward.
These have a specific interpretation.  Technically, the prices should be
interpreted as the “fair market value” of the protection, or the insurance value of the
option.  Values of any analytically derived option premium are the fair market value of
the instrument.  It is “Fair” in the sense that it is actuarially fair.  Buyers should be willing
to buy and accept these premiums.  And, sellers should be willing to sell or offer options
at these values.
Durum prices are not exchange traded in contrast to American puts and calls on
futures.  If they were, and if adequate numbers of buyers and sellers participated, the
observed traded option premiums would converge to these values.  Use of non-
exchange trade options requires the contractor to implicitly accrue the implied costs of
options, or, explicitly reflect costs of option features in a contract.  
Vanilla options can be valued using a formula called BOPM.  These values are a
function of expected price, the price floor or ceiling (Strike Price), time remaining until
maturity (in years), expected price Volatility (annualized percentage), and the risk-free
Interest Rate (annual percentage).  Though the BOPM was originally developed for
European style options, it can be used to value vanilla options.  
A model was developed to derive premiums for illustration.  Sensitivities with
respect to critical variables, namely volatilities and different durations forward were
9The model and ideas presented in this section build upon previous joint work between the authors and
Dr. David Bullock of FCStone, Minneapolis.  His input and ideas were both constructive and insightful. 
42conducted.  Volatility is typically derived using historical data.  In practice these should
be projected volatilities i.e., during the pricing period, and are subject to strategic
judgment.  The base case premiums for puts (floor), calls (ceiling) and min/max
contracts are shown below.  These are derived assuming a 3% interest rate, and 30%
volatility, for floor and ceiling prices of 700 and 800c/bu, and were derived for different
months forward from February 2009.
Three values are derived.  One is the floor premium.  Second is a ceiling
premium.  Finally, a min/max premium, which is defined as the difference is derived. 
These are the basis of the values used for illustration in the text.  Several sensitivities
are important.  One is the time period of coverage.  In concept, the further forward a
minimum or maximum is guaranteed, the greater should be the premium.  Simply, the
greater the time to maturity, the greater chance prices will change adversely.  As shown
here, the put value for a May delivery is 28c, where as those for a September delivery is
47c.  This is expected and a product of any form of insurance.  For buyers and growers,
this simply means that for longer periods of contracting, option premiums should be
greater.
Volatility is one of the important factors impacting option premiums.  Greater
volatility means greater risk; which means a greater cost (value) to insure prices.  As
volatility increases, option premiums increase.  For illustration, the model was revised 
assuming volatilities of 10, 20, 30 and 40.  The corresponding values for the September
700 put options are: 6, 25, 47 and 69c/bu respectively.  Thus, it is clear that as volatility
increases, the implied premium increases, which is deducted from grower prices in
deriving a guaranteed minimum.  
Finally, different premiums would exist for different price floors.  Our base case
had a price floor of 700c/bu.  The premium for this was 47c/bu and in a minimum price
contract would be deducted from the base price.  For illustration, we derived the
premium for price floors ranging from 550c/bu to 950c/bu; and for price ceilings from
950c/bu to 550c/bu.  These were all evaluated relative to September 2009 and the
results are shown below.
Mar-09 Apr-09 May-09 Jun-09 Jul-09 Aug-09 Sep-09 Oct-09
Price Forecast 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50
Volatility Forecast 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30%
Price Floor 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00
Price Ceiling 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 8.00
Floor Premium 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.43 0.47 0.51
Ceiling Premium 0.16 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.42 0.47 0.51 0.56
Min/Max Premium -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.05
43Price Level  c/bu Floor Premium  c/bu Ceiling Premium  c/bu









Finally, in summary, it is important that option premiums would be revised during
a contracting period.  Throughout the contract period, it will be important to revise the
option premiums.  The most important revisions would be with respect to, in rank order:
Date of contracting; potential changes in measures/estimates of volatility; and interest
costs
44Appendix B.  Certainty Equivalents and Risk Premiums for Sensitivities.
Appendix Table B1.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Durum Fixed Price
Contract with AOG by Level of Fixed Price ($/a)










0 67.38 77.36 87.35 97.33 107.31
0.0049 62.90 72.88 82.86 92.84 102.81
0.0098 58.82 68.79 78.76 88.73 98.70
0.0146 55.06 65.03 74.99 84.96 94.92
0.0195 51.59 61.55 71.51 81.47 91.42
0.0244 48.38 58.33 68.28 78.23 88.18
0.0293 45.40 55.35 65.29 75.23 85.17
0.0341 42.64 52.58 62.52 72.45 82.38
0.0390 40.08 50.01 59.94 69.87 79.79
0.0439 37.69 47.63 57.55 67.47 77.37
0.0488 35.48 45.40 55.32 65.23 75.13
0.0536 33.41 43.33 53.24 63.15 73.04
0.0585 31.48 41.40 51.30 61.20 71.08
0.0634 29.67 39.59 49.49 59.37 69.24
0.0683 27.98 37.88 47.78 57.66 67.52
0.0731 26.38 36.28 46.17 56.05 65.90
0.0780 24.87 34.77 44.66 54.53 64.37
0.0829 23.44 33.34 43.23 53.09 62.92
0.0878 22.09 31.99 41.87 51.72 61.55
0.0926 20.81 30.70 40.58 50.43 60.25
0.0975 19.58 29.48 39.35 49.20 59.01
0.1024 18.41 28.31 38.18 48.02 57.84
0.1073 17.30 27.19 37.06 46.90 56.71
0.1121 16.23 26.12 35.99 45.83 55.63
0.1170 15.21 25.10 34.97 44.81 54.60
45Appendix Table B2.  Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged by Risk Attitude for
Durum Fixed Price Contract with AOG by Level of Fixed Price ($/a)










0     (12.54) (2.56) 7.42 17.41 27.39
0.0049     (14.29) (4.31) 5.66 15.64 25.62
0.0098     (15.88) (5.90) 4.07 14.04 24.01
0.0146     (17.32) (7.35) 2.61 12.58 22.54
0.0195     (18.62) (8.66) 1.30 11.25 21.21
0.0244     (19.79) (9.84) 0.11 10.06 20.01
0.0293     (20.84) (10.89) (0.95) 8.99 18.93
0.0341     (21.77) (11.83) (1.90) 8.04 17.97
0.0390     (22.60) (12.66) (2.73) 7.19 17.11
0.0439     (23.33) (13.40) (3.47) 6.44 16.35
0.0488     (23.97) (14.04) (4.12) 5.79 15.68
0.0536     (24.53) (14.61) (4.70) 5.20 15.09
0.0585     (25.02) (15.11) (5.20) 4.69 14.57
0.0634     (25.46) (15.55) (5.65) 4.24 14.11
0.0683     (25.85) (15.95) (6.05) 3.83 13.69
0.0731     (26.20) (16.30) (6.41) 3.47 13.32
0.0780     (26.52) (16.62) (6.73) 3.14 12.98
0.0829     (26.80) (16.90) (7.02) 2.84 12.68
0.0878     (27.07) (17.17) (7.29) 2.57 12.40
0.0926     (27.31) (17.41) (7.54) 2.32 12.14
0.0975     (27.53) (17.64) (7.77) 2.08 11.90
0.1024     (27.75) (17.85) (7.98) 1.86 11.67
0.1073     (27.95) (18.05) (8.18) 1.66 11.46
0.1121     (28.14) (18.24) (8.38) 1.46 11.27
0.1170     (28.32) (18.43) (8.56) 1.28 11.08
46Appendix Table B3.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract

















0 79.92 67.38 27.38 47.38 67.38 87.38 107.38 127.38
0.0049 77.19 62.91 21.11 41.11 61.11 81.11 101.11 121.11
0.0098 74.70 58.82 15.25 35.25 55.25 75.25 95.25 115.25
0.0146 72.38 55.07 9.72 29.72 49.72 69.72 89.72 109.72
0.0195 70.21 51.60 4.48 24.48 44.48 64.48 84.48 104.48
0.0244 68.17 48.39 (0.49) 19.51 39.51 59.51 79.51 99.51
0.0293 66.24 45.41 (5.21) 14.79 34.79 54.79 74.79 94.79
0.0341 64.41 42.65 (9.68) 10.32 30.32 50.32 70.32 90.32
0.0390 62.68 40.10 (13.92) 6.08 26.08 46.08 66.08 86.08
0.0439 61.02 37.72 (17.94) 2.06 22.06 42.06 62.06 82.06
0.0488 59.44 35.50 (21.73) (1.73) 18.27 38.27 58.27 78.27
0.0536 57.94 33.44 (25.31) (5.31) 14.69 34.69 54.69 74.69
0.0585 56.51 31.51 (28.69) (8.69) 11.31 31.31 51.31 71.31
0.0634 55.14 29.71 (31.88) (11.88) 8.12 28.12 48.12 68.12
0.0683 53.83 28.01 (34.88) (14.88) 5.12 25.12 45.12 65.12
0.0731 52.58 26.42 (37.72) (17.72) 2.28 22.28 42.28 62.28
0.0780 51.39 24.91 (40.39) (20.39) (0.39) 19.61 39.61 59.61
0.0829 50.25 23.48 (42.91) (22.91) (2.91) 17.09 37.09 57.09
0.0878 49.16 22.13 (45.29) (25.29) (5.29) 14.71 34.71 54.71
0.0926 48.11 20.84 (47.54) (27.54) (7.54) 12.46 32.46 52.46
0.0975 47.12 19.62 (49.68) (29.68) (9.68) 10.32 30.32 50.32
0.1024 46.16 18.45 (51.69) (31.69) (11.69) 8.31 28.31 48.31
0.1073 45.25 17.34 (53.61) (33.61) (13.61) 6.39 26.39 46.39
0.1121 44.37 16.27 (55.42) (35.42) (15.42) 4.58 24.58 44.58
0.1170 43.53 15.24 (57.15) (37.15) (17.15) 2.85 22.85 42.85
47Appendix Table B4. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for

















0           -        (12.54)     (52.54)     (32.54)     (12.54)        7.46       27.46       47.46 
0.0049           -        (14.29)     (56.08)     (36.08)     (16.08)        3.92       23.92       43.92 
0.0098           -        (15.87)     (59.45)     (39.45)     (19.45)        0.55       20.55       40.55 
0.0146           -        (17.31)     (62.66)     (42.66)     (22.66)       (2.66)      17.34       37.34 
0.0195           -        (18.61)     (65.73)     (45.73)     (25.73)       (5.73)      14.27       34.27 
0.0244           -        (19.78)     (68.66)     (48.66)     (28.66)       (8.66)      11.34       31.34 
0.0293           -        (20.83)     (71.45)     (51.45)     (31.45)     (11.45)        8.55       28.55 
0.0341           -        (21.76)     (74.10)     (54.10)     (34.10)     (14.10)        5.90       25.90 
0.0390           -        (22.58)     (76.60)     (56.60)     (36.60)     (16.60)        3.40       23.40 
0.0439           -        (23.30)     (78.96)     (58.96)     (38.96)     (18.96)        1.04       21.04 
0.0488           -        (23.94)     (81.17)     (61.17)     (41.17)     (21.17)       (1.17)      18.83 
0.0536           -        (24.50)     (83.25)     (63.25)     (43.25)     (23.25)       (3.25)      16.75 
0.0585           -        (24.99)     (85.20)     (65.20)     (45.20)     (25.20)       (5.20)      14.80 
0.0634           -        (25.43)     (87.02)     (67.02)     (47.02)     (27.02)       (7.02)      12.98 
0.0683           -        (25.82)     (88.71)     (68.71)     (48.71)     (28.71)       (8.71)      11.29 
0.0731           -        (26.17)     (90.30)     (70.30)     (50.30)     (30.30)     (10.30)        9.70 
0.0780           -        (26.48)     (91.78)     (71.78)     (51.78)     (31.78)     (11.78)        8.22 
0.0829           -        (26.76)     (93.16)     (73.16)     (53.16)     (33.16)     (13.16)        6.84 
0.0878           -        (27.03)     (94.45)     (74.45)     (54.45)     (34.45)     (14.45)        5.55 
0.0926           -        (27.27)     (95.66)     (75.66)     (55.66)     (35.66)     (15.66)        4.34 
0.0975           -        (27.50)     (96.79)     (76.79)     (56.79)     (36.79)     (16.79)        3.21 
0.1024           -        (27.71)     (97.85)     (77.85)     (57.85)     (37.85)     (17.85)        2.15 
0.1073           -        (27.91)     (98.85)     (78.85)     (58.85)     (38.85)     (18.85)        1.15 
0.1121           -        (28.10)     (99.79)     (79.79)     (59.79)     (39.79)     (19.79)        0.21 
0.1170           -        (28.28) (100.67)     (80.67)     (60.67)     (40.67)     (20.67)       (0.67)
48Appendix Table B5.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract



















0 79.92 81.42 79.92 86.11 86.11 87.50 90.30 82.84 86.11
0.0049 73.83 72.52 77.19 83.41 81.66 79.63 82.79 79.40 83.42
0.0098 68.16 66.14 74.70 81.01 77.53 74.10 77.51 76.41 81.02
0.0146 62.85 61.21 72.38 78.83 73.63 69.86 73.48 73.76 78.83
0.0195 57.83 57.16 70.21 76.81 69.92 66.42 70.19 71.36 76.82
0.0244 53.09 53.71 68.17 74.92 66.35 63.50 67.40 69.18 74.93
0.0293 48.59 50.69 66.24 73.14 62.90 60.94 64.95 67.15 73.15
0.0341 44.34 48.00 64.41 71.44 59.54 58.66 62.77 65.27 71.46
0.0390 40.31 45.57 62.68 69.82 56.27 56.59 60.77 63.51 69.85
0.0439 36.51 43.34 61.02 68.27 53.07 54.69 58.94 61.85 68.31
0.0488 32.93 41.28 59.44 66.78 49.92 52.93 57.23 60.28 66.83
0.0536 29.57 39.37 57.94 65.34 46.84 51.28 55.63 58.79 65.41
0.0585 26.40 37.59 56.51 63.96 43.81 49.73 54.13 57.37 64.04
0.0634 23.43 35.92 55.14 62.63 40.83 48.27 52.70 56.03 62.73
0.0683 20.65 34.34 53.83 61.34 37.90 46.89 51.35 54.74 61.46
0.0731 18.04 32.86 52.58 60.10 35.03 45.57 50.07 53.51 60.25
0.0780 15.60 31.45 51.39 58.90 32.23 44.32 48.85 52.33 59.07
0.0829 13.31 30.12 50.25 57.74 29.49 43.13 47.68 51.21 57.95
0.0878 11.17 28.86 49.16 56.63 26.82 41.99 46.57 50.13 56.86
0.0926 9.16 27.66 48.11 55.55 24.23 40.91 45.51 49.10 55.82
0.0975 7.27 26.51 47.12 54.51 21.73 39.87 44.49 48.11 54.82
0.1024 5.49 25.42 46.16 53.50 19.31 38.88 43.52 47.16 53.86
0.1073 3.81 24.38 45.25 52.53 16.99 37.92 42.58 46.25 52.94
0.1121 2.23 23.39 44.37 51.59 14.76 37.01 41.69 45.38 52.05
0.1170 0.74 22.44 43.53 50.68 12.63 36.14 40.83 44.54 51.19
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0 79.92 57.44 79.92 62.13 62.13 63.51 66.32 58.85 62.13
0.0049 73.83 45.74 77.19 57.26 55.51 52.96 56.16 53.10 57.26
0.0098 68.16 37.11 74.70 52.90 49.42 45.22 48.70 48.05 52.89
0.0146 62.85 30.32 72.38 48.96 43.78 39.14 42.82 43.58 48.96
0.0195 57.83 24.77 70.21 45.41 38.53 34.14 37.97 39.61 45.41
0.0244 53.09 20.10 68.17 42.20 33.63 29.91 33.86 36.07 42.19
0.0293 48.59 16.11 66.24 39.30 29.03 26.27 30.31 32.91 39.28
0.0341 44.34 12.65 64.41 36.65 24.69 23.09 27.19 30.07 36.63
0.0390 40.31 9.63 62.68 34.25 20.60 20.28 24.43 27.51 34.22
0.0439 36.51 6.95 61.02 32.05 16.71 17.77 21.96 25.18 32.02
0.0488 32.93 4.57 59.44 30.03 13.01 15.51 19.73 23.06 29.99
0.0536 29.57 2.43 57.94 28.16 9.48 13.46 17.71 21.12 28.13
0.0585 26.40 0.50 56.51 26.43 6.10 11.59 15.86 19.34 26.40
0.0634 23.43 (1.26) 55.14 24.83 2.87 9.88 14.15 17.68 24.78
0.0683 20.65 (2.87) 53.83 23.33 (0.22) 8.30 12.58 16.15 23.28
0.0731 18.04 (4.34) 52.58 21.92 (3.19) 6.83 11.11 14.71 21.87
0.0780 15.60 (5.70) 51.39 20.59 (6.03) 5.45 9.74 13.36 20.54
0.0829 13.31 (6.96) 50.25 19.33 (8.75) 4.17 8.45 12.09 19.28
0.0878 11.17 (8.13) 49.16 18.14 (11.35) 2.96 7.24 10.89 18.08
0.0926 9.16 (9.23) 48.11 17.01 (13.85) 1.81 6.09 9.76 16.95
0.0975 7.27 (10.25) 47.12 15.92 (16.23) 0.73 5.00 8.67 15.86
0.1024 5.49 (11.22) 46.16 14.89 (18.50) (0.30) 3.96 7.64 14.83
0.1073 3.81 (12.12) 45.25 13.89 (20.66) (1.28) 2.97 6.65 13.83
0.1121 2.23 (12.98) 44.37 12.94 (22.73) (2.22) 2.02 5.71 12.88
0.1170 0.74 (13.79) 43.53 12.02 (24.70) (3.12) 1.11 4.80 11.96
50Appendix Table B7. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00         1.50            -           6.19         6.19         7.57       10.38         2.92         6.19 
0.0049       (3.36)       (4.68)           -           6.22         4.47         2.43         5.59         2.20         6.22 
0.0098       (6.53)       (8.55)           -           6.32         2.83        (0.60)        2.82         1.71         6.32 
0.0146       (9.53)     (11.17)           -           6.45         1.25        (2.52)        1.10         1.38         6.46 
0.0195     (12.38)     (13.05)           -           6.60        (0.29)       (3.79)       (0.02)        1.15         6.61 
0.0244     (15.08)     (14.46)           -           6.75        (1.82)       (4.67)       (0.77)        1.01         6.76 
0.0293     (17.65)     (15.55)           -           6.89        (3.34)       (5.30)       (1.29)        0.91         6.91 
0.0341     (20.08)     (16.41)           -           7.03        (4.87)       (5.75)       (1.65)        0.86         7.05 
0.0390     (22.36)     (17.11)           -           7.15        (6.41)       (6.08)       (1.90)        0.83         7.17 
0.0439     (24.51)     (17.68)           -           7.25        (7.96)       (6.33)       (2.09)        0.83         7.29 
0.0488     (26.51)     (18.16)           -           7.33        (9.52)       (6.52)       (2.22)        0.83         7.38 
0.0536     (28.38)     (18.57)           -           7.40      (11.10)       (6.66)       (2.31)        0.85         7.47 
0.0585     (30.11)     (18.92)           -           7.45      (12.70)       (6.78)       (2.38)        0.87         7.53 
0.0634     (31.70)     (19.22)           -           7.49      (14.31)       (6.87)       (2.43)        0.89         7.59 
0.0683     (33.18)     (19.49)           -           7.51      (15.93)       (6.94)       (2.48)        0.91         7.63 
0.0731     (34.54)     (19.72)           -           7.52      (17.55)       (7.01)       (2.51)        0.93         7.66 
0.0780     (35.78)     (19.93)           -           7.51      (19.16)       (7.07)       (2.54)        0.95         7.69 
0.0829     (36.93)     (20.13)           -           7.50      (20.76)       (7.12)       (2.56)        0.96         7.70 
0.0878     (37.99)     (20.30)           -           7.47      (22.34)       (7.16)       (2.58)        0.97         7.71 
0.0926     (38.96)     (20.46)           -           7.43      (23.88)       (7.21)       (2.61)        0.98         7.71 
0.0975     (39.85)     (20.60)           -           7.39      (25.39)       (7.25)       (2.63)        0.99         7.71 
0.1024     (40.67)     (20.74)           -           7.34      (26.85)       (7.28)       (2.65)        1.00         7.70 
0.1073     (41.43)     (20.86)           -           7.28      (28.25)       (7.32)       (2.66)        1.01         7.69 
0.1121     (42.13)     (20.98)           -           7.22      (29.60)       (7.36)       (2.68)        1.01         7.68 
0.1170     (42.78)     (21.08)           -           7.15      (30.89)       (7.39)       (2.70)        1.01         7.67 
51Appendix Table B8. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (22.49)           -        (17.79)     (17.79)     (16.41)     (13.60)     (21.07)     (17.79)
0.0049       (3.36)     (31.46)           -        (19.93)     (21.68)     (24.24)     (21.04)     (24.09)     (19.94)
0.0098       (6.53)     (37.59)           -        (21.80)     (25.27)     (29.47)     (26.00)     (26.65)     (21.80)
0.0146       (9.53)     (42.06)           -        (23.41)     (28.60)     (33.24)     (29.56)     (28.80)     (23.42)
0.0195     (12.38)     (45.44)           -        (24.80)     (31.68)     (36.07)     (32.24)     (30.60)     (24.80)
0.0244     (15.08)     (48.07)           -        (25.97)     (34.54)     (38.26)     (34.31)     (32.10)     (25.98)
0.0293     (17.65)     (50.13)           -        (26.95)     (37.21)     (39.97)     (35.93)     (33.33)     (26.96)
0.0341     (20.08)     (51.76)           -        (27.76)     (39.72)     (41.32)     (37.22)     (34.34)     (27.78)
0.0390     (22.36)     (53.05)           -        (28.43)     (42.08)     (42.40)     (38.24)     (35.17)     (28.45)
0.0439     (24.51)     (54.07)           -        (28.97)     (44.31)     (43.25)     (39.06)     (35.84)     (29.00)
0.0488     (26.51)     (54.88)           -        (29.42)     (46.44)     (43.94)     (39.71)     (36.38)     (29.45)
0.0536     (28.38)     (55.51)           -        (29.78)     (48.46)     (44.48)     (40.23)     (36.82)     (29.82)
0.0585     (30.11)     (56.01)           -        (30.07)     (50.40)     (44.91)     (40.65)     (37.17)     (30.11)
0.0634     (31.70)     (56.40)           -        (30.31)     (52.26)     (45.26)     (40.98)     (37.45)     (30.35)
0.0683     (33.18)     (56.70)           -        (30.50)     (54.05)     (45.53)     (41.25)     (37.68)     (30.55)
0.0731     (34.54)     (56.92)           -        (30.66)     (55.77)     (45.76)     (41.47)     (37.87)     (30.71)
0.0780     (35.78)     (57.09)           -        (30.80)     (57.42)     (45.93)     (41.65)     (38.03)     (30.85)
0.0829     (36.93)     (57.21)           -        (30.92)     (59.00)     (46.08)     (41.80)     (38.15)     (30.97)
0.0878     (37.99)     (57.29)           -        (31.02)     (60.51)     (46.20)     (41.92)     (38.26)     (31.07)
0.0926     (38.96)     (57.34)           -        (31.11)     (61.96)     (46.30)     (42.03)     (38.36)     (31.17)
0.0975     (39.85)     (57.37)           -        (31.19)     (63.34)     (46.39)     (42.12)     (38.44)     (31.25)
0.1024     (40.67)     (57.38)           -        (31.27)     (64.66)     (46.46)     (42.20)     (38.52)     (31.33)
0.1073     (41.43)     (57.37)           -        (31.35)     (65.91)     (46.53)     (42.28)     (38.59)     (31.41)
0.1121     (42.13)     (57.35)           -        (31.43)     (67.10)     (46.59)     (42.35)     (38.66)     (31.49)
0.1170     (42.78)     (57.32)           -        (31.51)     (68.22)     (46.64)     (42.42)     (38.73)     (31.57)
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0 79.92 62.69 79.92 65.03 65.03 65.73 67.13 63.40 65.03
0.0049 73.83 51.53 75.96 57.90 57.46 55.17 56.79 55.60 57.90
0.0098 68.16 43.23 72.33 51.99 51.11 47.35 49.13 49.21 51.99
0.0146 62.85 36.61 68.97 46.93 45.61 41.13 43.03 43.80 46.93
0.0195 57.83 31.11 65.84 42.51 40.75 35.95 37.94 39.12 42.51
0.0244 53.09 26.40 62.90 38.59 36.39 31.51 33.57 35.01 38.59
0.0293 48.59 22.31 60.14 35.08 32.44 27.63 29.75 31.35 35.08
0.0341 44.34 18.70 57.54 31.93 28.85 24.20 26.37 28.08 31.93
0.0390 40.31 15.50 55.08 29.07 25.55 21.15 23.35 25.14 29.07
0.0439 36.51 12.64 52.75 26.48 22.52 18.40 20.62 22.47 26.48
0.0488 32.93 10.06 50.54 24.11 19.71 15.91 18.16 20.05 24.11
0.0536 29.57 7.73 48.45 21.95 17.11 13.65 15.92 17.84 21.95
0.0585 26.40 5.61 46.46 19.96 14.70 11.59 13.87 15.82 19.96
0.0634 23.43 3.68 44.58 18.13 12.44 9.70 11.99 13.95 18.13
0.0683 20.65 1.90 42.78 16.43 10.33 7.96 10.25 12.23 16.43
0.0731 18.04 0.27 41.08 14.86 8.34 6.35 8.65 10.64 14.86
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 39.46 13.40 6.48 4.86 7.16 9.16 13.40
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 37.91 12.03 4.72 3.47 5.77 7.77 12.03
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 36.44 10.75 3.06 2.17 4.47 6.48 10.75
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 35.04 9.55 1.48 0.95 3.26 5.27 9.55
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 33.71 8.42 (0.01) (0.19) 2.11 4.13 8.42
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 32.44 7.36 (1.43) (1.26) 1.04 3.05 7.36
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 31.22 6.35 (2.78) (2.28) 0.02 2.03 6.35
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 30.07 5.39 (4.06) (3.24) (0.95) 1.07 5.39
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 28.96 4.48 (5.28) (4.15) (1.86) 0.15 4.48
53Appendix Table B10.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract



















0 79.92 62.69 79.92 66.21 66.21 67.24 69.35 63.75 66.21
0.0049 73.83 51.53 76.69 60.59 59.59 56.96 59.37 57.31 60.59
0.0098 68.16 43.23 73.74 55.70 53.70 49.36 51.99 51.80 55.69
0.0146 62.85 36.61 71.02 51.35 48.35 43.31 46.11 46.97 51.34
0.0195 57.83 31.11 68.48 47.44 43.45 38.26 41.19 42.70 47.43
0.0244 53.09 26.40 66.11 43.90 38.92 33.92 36.96 38.87 43.89
0.0293 48.59 22.31 63.89 40.68 34.71 30.13 33.25 35.43 40.67
0.0341 44.34 18.70 61.79 37.74 30.78 26.77 29.94 32.32 37.73
0.0390 40.31 15.50 59.82 35.05 27.12 23.75 26.98 29.49 35.04
0.0439 36.51 12.64 57.95 32.58 23.69 21.04 24.30 26.91 32.57
0.0488 32.93 10.06 56.18 30.30 20.48 18.58 21.86 24.55 30.29
0.0536 29.57 7.73 54.51 28.20 17.48 16.33 19.64 22.38 28.20
0.0585 26.40 5.61 52.92 26.26 14.65 14.28 17.60 20.38 26.25
0.0634 23.43 3.68 51.41 24.46 11.99 12.38 15.71 18.52 24.45
0.0683 20.65 1.90 49.97 22.78 9.50 10.64 13.97 16.80 22.77
0.0731 18.04 0.27 48.61 21.21 7.14 9.02 12.35 15.20 21.21
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 47.31 19.75 4.93 7.51 10.84 13.70 19.74
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 46.07 18.37 2.83 6.10 9.43 12.30 18.36
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 44.89 17.07 0.86 4.78 8.10 10.98 17.06
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 43.77 15.85 (1.01) 3.55 6.86 9.73 15.84
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 42.70 14.69 (2.78) 2.38 5.68 8.56 14.68
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 41.67 13.59 (4.46) 1.28 4.57 7.44 13.58
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 40.69 12.54 (6.05) 0.24 3.51 6.38 12.54
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 39.75 11.54 (7.56) (0.75) 2.51 5.37 11.54
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 38.85 10.59 (9.00) (1.69) 1.55 4.41 10.59
54Appendix Table B11.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract



















0 79.92 62.69 79.92 68.55 68.56 70.28 73.79 64.46 68.53
0.0049 73.83 51.53 77.47 64.80 61.99 60.49 64.46 59.97 64.77
0.0098 68.16 43.23 75.20 61.23 55.62 53.26 57.55 55.82 61.21
0.0146 62.85 36.61 73.06 57.84 49.45 47.49 52.02 51.99 57.82
0.0195 57.83 31.11 71.02 54.62 43.46 42.65 47.37 48.43 54.61
0.0244 53.09 26.40 69.06 51.57 37.68 38.48 43.34 45.14 51.56
0.0293 48.59 22.31 67.18 48.68 32.10 34.80 39.76 42.09 48.69
0.0341 44.34 18.70 65.36 45.95 26.74 31.51 36.55 39.26 45.97
0.0390 40.31 15.50 63.59 43.37 21.60 28.54 33.64 36.63 43.41
0.0439 36.51 12.64 61.87 40.94 16.69 25.85 30.98 34.18 41.00
0.0488 32.93 10.06 60.19 38.63 11.99 23.38 28.53 31.90 38.72
0.0536 29.57 7.73 58.56 36.45 7.50 21.12 26.28 29.76 36.57
0.0585 26.40 5.61 56.98 34.38 3.22 19.03 24.19 27.77 34.54
0.0634 23.43 3.68 55.43 32.41 (0.88) 17.09 22.23 25.89 32.62
0.0683 20.65 1.90 53.92 30.54 (4.81) 15.28 20.41 24.12 30.80
0.0731 18.04 0.27 52.46 28.75 (8.57) 13.60 18.70 22.45 29.07
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 51.03 27.05 (12.18) 12.02 17.08 20.87 27.43
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 49.64 25.42 (15.63) 10.53 15.56 19.36 25.87
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 48.30 23.86 (18.94) 9.13 14.11 17.93 24.37
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 46.99 22.37 (22.11) 7.80 12.74 16.56 22.95
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 45.71 20.93 (25.14) 6.55 11.43 15.25 21.59
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 44.48 19.56 (28.03) 5.35 10.19 14.00 20.29
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 43.28 18.24 (30.79) 4.21 8.99 12.80 19.05
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 42.12 16.96 (33.41) 3.13 7.85 11.64 17.86
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 40.99 15.74 (35.91) 2.09 6.75 10.53 16.72
55Appendix Table B12.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract



















0 79.92 62.69 79.92 69.38 69.38 71.35 75.34 64.71 69.16
0.0049 73.83 51.53 77.53 65.84 62.19 61.71 66.21 60.61 65.63
0.0098 68.16 43.23 75.28 62.39 55.09 54.59 59.44 56.76 62.22
0.0146 62.85 36.61 73.12 59.01 48.08 48.90 54.01 53.12 58.93
0.0195 57.83 31.11 71.03 55.72 41.18 44.12 49.43 49.70 55.75
0.0244 53.09 26.40 68.99 52.50 34.42 39.99 45.44 46.48 52.72
0.0293 48.59 22.31 66.99 49.37 27.81 36.33 41.89 43.46 49.81
0.0341 44.34 18.70 65.01 46.30 21.37 33.05 38.69 40.62 47.05
0.0390 40.31 15.50 63.05 43.30 15.12 30.09 35.77 37.95 44.43
0.0439 36.51 12.64 61.11 40.37 9.05 27.38 33.10 35.44 41.94
0.0488 32.93 10.06 59.18 37.50 3.18 24.90 30.63 33.08 39.58
0.0536 29.57 7.73 57.27 34.69 (2.51) 22.62 28.35 30.85 37.34
0.0585 26.40 5.61 55.37 31.94 (8.00) 20.50 26.22 28.74 35.22
0.0634 23.43 3.68 53.50 29.24 (13.30) 18.53 24.22 26.75 33.21
0.0683 20.65 1.90 51.64 26.60 (18.38) 16.69 22.35 24.85 31.31
0.0731 18.04 0.27 49.82 24.03 (23.23) 14.97 20.58 23.04 29.50
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 48.02 21.52 (27.84) 13.35 18.92 21.32 27.78
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 46.26 19.08 (32.21) 11.83 17.33 19.67 26.15
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 44.53 16.72 (36.32) 10.38 15.83 18.10 24.60
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 42.85 14.44 (40.19) 9.02 14.40 16.59 23.12
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 41.21 12.24 (43.81) 7.72 13.03 15.14 21.71
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 39.61 10.13 (47.19) 6.48 11.72 13.74 20.36
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 38.06 8.11 (50.35) 5.30 10.46 12.40 19.08
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 36.57 6.16 (53.30) 4.18 9.26 11.12 17.85
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 35.12 4.31 (56.06) 3.10 8.11 9.88 16.68
56Appendix Table B13. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (17.24)           -        (14.89)     (14.89)     (14.20)     (12.79)     (16.53)     (14.89)
0.0049       (2.13)     (24.43)           -        (18.06)     (18.51)     (20.79)     (19.18)     (20.36)     (18.06)
0.0098       (4.17)     (29.11)           -        (20.34)     (21.22)     (24.98)     (23.21)     (23.12)     (20.34)
0.0146       (6.13)     (32.36)           -        (22.04)     (23.36)     (27.84)     (25.94)     (25.17)     (22.04)
0.0195       (8.01)     (34.73)           -        (23.33)     (25.09)     (29.89)     (27.90)     (26.72)     (23.33)
0.0244       (9.82)     (36.50)           -        (24.31)     (26.51)     (31.39)     (29.33)     (27.90)     (24.31)
0.0293     (11.55)     (37.84)           -        (25.06)     (27.70)     (32.51)     (30.39)     (28.79)     (25.06)
0.0341     (13.20)     (38.84)           -        (25.61)     (28.69)     (33.33)     (31.17)     (29.46)     (25.61)
0.0390     (14.76)     (39.58)           -        (26.00)     (29.53)     (33.93)     (31.73)     (29.94)     (26.00)
0.0439     (16.23)     (40.11)           -        (26.27)     (30.23)     (34.35)     (32.12)     (30.28)     (26.27)
0.0488     (17.61)     (40.48)           -        (26.43)     (30.83)     (34.63)     (32.38)     (30.49)     (26.43)
0.0536     (18.88)     (40.72)           -        (26.50)     (31.34)     (34.80)     (32.53)     (30.61)     (26.50)
0.0585     (20.06)     (40.85)           -        (26.50)     (31.77)     (34.87)     (32.59)     (30.65)     (26.50)
0.0634     (21.14)     (40.90)           -        (26.45)     (32.14)     (34.88)     (32.59)     (30.62)     (26.45)
0.0683     (22.13)     (40.88)           -        (26.35)     (32.46)     (34.82)     (32.53)     (30.55)     (26.35)
0.0731     (23.03)     (40.81)           -        (26.22)     (32.73)     (34.73)     (32.43)     (30.44)     (26.22)
0.0780     (23.85)     (40.69)           -        (26.06)     (32.98)     (34.60)     (32.30)     (30.30)     (26.06)
0.0829     (24.60)     (40.55)           -        (25.88)     (33.19)     (34.45)     (32.14)     (30.14)     (25.88)
0.0878     (25.27)     (40.38)           -        (25.69)     (33.39)     (34.27)     (31.97)     (29.96)     (25.69)
0.0926     (25.89)     (40.20)           -        (25.49)     (33.56)     (34.09)     (31.79)     (29.78)     (25.49)
0.0975     (26.44)     (40.00)           -        (25.29)     (33.72)     (33.90)     (31.60)     (29.58)     (25.29)
0.1024     (26.95)     (39.80)           -        (25.08)     (33.87)     (33.70)     (31.40)     (29.39)     (25.08)
0.1073     (27.41)     (39.59)           -        (24.88)     (34.00)     (33.50)     (31.21)     (29.19)     (24.88)
0.1121     (27.83)     (39.38)           -        (24.68)     (34.13)     (33.30)     (31.01)     (29.00)     (24.68)
0.1170     (28.22)     (39.17)           -        (24.48)     (34.25)     (33.11)     (30.82)     (28.81)     (24.48)
57Appendix Table B14. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (17.24)           -        (13.71)     (13.71)     (12.68)     (10.57)     (16.17)     (13.72)
0.0049       (2.86)     (25.16)           -        (16.10)     (17.10)     (19.73)     (17.32)     (19.38)     (16.10)
0.0098       (5.58)     (30.51)           -        (18.04)     (20.05)     (24.38)     (21.75)     (21.95)     (18.05)
0.0146       (8.17)     (34.41)           -        (19.67)     (22.66)     (27.71)     (24.91)     (24.05)     (19.67)
0.0195     (10.65)     (37.38)           -        (21.04)     (25.03)     (30.22)     (27.29)     (25.79)     (21.05)
0.0244     (13.03)     (39.71)           -        (22.21)     (27.20)     (32.19)     (29.15)     (27.24)     (22.22)
0.0293     (15.30)     (41.58)           -        (23.21)     (29.18)     (33.76)     (30.64)     (28.46)     (23.22)
0.0341     (17.46)     (43.09)           -        (24.06)     (31.01)     (35.03)     (31.85)     (29.47)     (24.06)
0.0390     (19.50)     (44.32)           -        (24.77)     (32.70)     (36.06)     (32.84)     (30.33)     (24.78)
0.0439     (21.44)     (45.31)           -        (25.37)     (34.26)     (36.91)     (33.65)     (31.04)     (25.38)
0.0488     (23.25)     (46.12)           -        (25.88)     (35.70)     (37.61)     (34.32)     (31.63)     (25.89)
0.0536     (24.94)     (46.77)           -        (26.30)     (37.03)     (38.17)     (34.87)     (32.13)     (26.31)
0.0585     (26.51)     (47.30)           -        (26.65)     (38.27)     (38.64)     (35.32)     (32.54)     (26.66)
0.0634     (27.97)     (47.73)           -        (26.95)     (39.41)     (39.02)     (35.69)     (32.88)     (26.95)
0.0683     (29.32)     (48.07)           -        (27.19)     (40.48)     (39.34)     (36.00)     (33.17)     (27.20)
0.0731     (30.56)     (48.34)           -        (27.39)     (41.46)     (39.59)     (36.26)     (33.41)     (27.40)
0.0780     (31.71)     (48.55)           -        (27.56)     (42.38)     (39.80)     (36.47)     (33.61)     (27.57)
0.0829     (32.76)     (48.71)           -        (27.70)     (43.24)     (39.97)     (36.64)     (33.77)     (27.71)
0.0878     (33.72)     (48.84)           -        (27.82)     (44.04)     (40.11)     (36.79)     (33.92)     (27.83)
0.0926     (34.61)     (48.93)           -        (27.92)     (44.78)     (40.22)     (36.91)     (34.04)     (27.93)
0.0975     (35.43)     (48.99)           -        (28.01)     (45.48)     (40.32)     (37.02)     (34.14)     (28.01)
0.1024     (36.18)     (49.03)           -        (28.08)     (46.13)     (40.39)     (37.10)     (34.23)     (28.09)
0.1073     (36.88)     (49.06)           -        (28.15)     (46.74)     (40.45)     (37.18)     (34.31)     (28.15)
0.1121     (37.52)     (49.07)           -        (28.21)     (47.32)     (40.51)     (37.24)     (34.38)     (28.21)
0.1170     (38.11)     (49.07)           -        (28.26)     (47.85)     (40.55)     (37.30)     (34.45)     (28.26)
58Appendix Table B15. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (17.23)           -        (11.37)     (11.36)       (9.64)       (6.13)     (15.46)     (11.39)
0.0049       (3.64)     (25.94)           -        (12.68)     (15.48)     (16.98)     (13.01)     (17.50)     (12.70)
0.0098       (7.03)     (31.97)           -        (13.97)     (19.57)     (21.94)     (17.65)     (19.38)     (13.99)
0.0146     (10.21)     (36.45)           -        (15.22)     (23.61)     (25.57)     (21.03)     (21.07)     (15.24)
0.0195     (13.19)     (39.91)           -        (16.40)     (27.55)     (28.36)     (23.64)     (22.58)     (16.41)
0.0244     (15.98)     (42.66)           -        (17.49)     (31.38)     (30.59)     (25.73)     (23.92)     (17.50)
0.0293     (18.59)     (44.87)           -        (18.50)     (35.08)     (32.38)     (27.42)     (25.09)     (18.49)
0.0341     (21.02)     (46.66)           -        (19.40)     (38.62)     (33.85)     (28.81)     (26.10)     (19.39)
0.0390     (23.27)     (48.09)           -        (20.21)     (41.99)     (35.05)     (29.95)     (26.96)     (20.18)
0.0439     (25.35)     (49.23)           -        (20.93)     (45.18)     (36.02)     (30.89)     (27.69)     (20.87)
0.0488     (27.26)     (50.13)           -        (21.57)     (48.20)     (36.81)     (31.66)     (28.30)     (21.47)
0.0536     (29.00)     (50.83)           -        (22.12)     (51.06)     (37.45)     (32.29)     (28.80)     (21.99)
0.0585     (30.57)     (51.36)           -        (22.60)     (53.76)     (37.95)     (32.79)     (29.21)     (22.43)
0.0634     (32.00)     (51.75)           -        (23.02)     (56.31)     (38.34)     (33.19)     (29.54)     (22.81)
0.0683     (33.27)     (52.02)           -        (23.39)     (58.73)     (38.64)     (33.51)     (29.80)     (23.12)
0.0731     (34.41)     (52.19)           -        (23.70)     (61.03)     (38.86)     (33.76)     (30.01)     (23.39)
0.0780     (35.43)     (52.27)           -        (23.98)     (63.21)     (39.01)     (33.95)     (30.16)     (23.60)
0.0829     (36.33)     (52.28)           -        (24.22)     (65.28)     (39.11)     (34.08)     (30.28)     (23.78)
0.0878     (37.13)     (52.24)           -        (24.43)     (67.24)     (39.17)     (34.18)     (30.37)     (23.92)
0.0926     (37.83)     (52.14)           -        (24.62)     (69.10)     (39.18)     (34.24)     (30.43)     (24.03)
0.0975     (38.45)     (52.01)           -        (24.78)     (70.86)     (39.17)     (34.28)     (30.46)     (24.12)
0.1024     (38.99)     (51.84)           -        (24.92)     (72.51)     (39.13)     (34.29)     (30.48)     (24.19)
0.1073     (39.47)     (51.65)           -        (25.05)     (74.07)     (39.07)     (34.29)     (30.49)     (24.23)
0.1121     (39.88)     (51.44)           -        (25.15)     (75.53)     (38.99)     (34.27)     (30.48)     (24.26)
0.1170     (40.25)     (51.20)           -        (25.25)     (76.90)     (38.90)     (34.24)     (30.46)     (24.27)
59Appendix Table B16. Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged  by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (17.23)           -        (10.54)     (10.54)       (8.57)       (4.58)     (15.21)     (10.76)
0.0049       (3.70)     (26.00)           -        (11.69)     (15.34)     (15.82)     (11.32)     (16.92)     (11.90)
0.0098       (7.12)     (32.05)           -        (12.89)     (20.19)     (20.69)     (15.84)     (18.52)     (13.06)
0.0146     (10.28)     (36.51)           -        (14.11)     (25.04)     (24.23)     (19.11)     (20.00)     (14.20)
0.0195     (13.20)     (39.93)           -        (15.31)     (29.85)     (26.91)     (21.60)     (21.33)     (15.28)
0.0244     (15.91)     (42.59)           -        (16.49)     (34.57)     (29.01)     (23.55)     (22.51)     (16.28)
0.0293     (18.40)     (44.68)           -        (17.62)     (39.18)     (30.66)     (25.10)     (23.53)     (17.17)
0.0341     (20.67)     (46.31)           -        (18.71)     (43.64)     (31.96)     (26.32)     (24.39)     (17.96)
0.0390     (22.74)     (47.55)           -        (19.75)     (47.93)     (32.97)     (27.28)     (25.10)     (18.62)
0.0439     (24.59)     (48.47)           -        (20.74)     (52.06)     (33.73)     (28.01)     (25.67)     (19.17)
0.0488     (26.25)     (49.12)           -        (21.68)     (56.00)     (34.28)     (28.55)     (26.10)     (19.60)
0.0536     (27.70)     (49.54)           -        (22.58)     (59.78)     (34.65)     (28.92)     (26.42)     (19.93)
0.0585     (28.97)     (49.76)           -        (23.44)     (63.38)     (34.87)     (29.16)     (26.63)     (20.15)
0.0634     (30.06)     (49.82)           -        (24.26)     (66.79)     (34.97)     (29.28)     (26.75)     (20.28)
0.0683     (30.99)     (49.74)           -        (25.04)     (70.02)     (34.95)     (29.30)     (26.79)     (20.33)
0.0731     (31.77)     (49.55)           -        (25.79)     (73.05)     (34.85)     (29.23)     (26.77)     (20.32)
0.0780     (32.42)     (49.26)           -        (26.50)     (75.86)     (34.67)     (29.11)     (26.70)     (20.24)
0.0829     (32.94)     (48.90)           -        (27.18)     (78.47)     (34.43)     (28.92)     (26.58)     (20.11)
0.0878     (33.36)     (48.47)           -        (27.81)     (80.86)     (34.15)     (28.70)     (26.43)     (19.94)
0.0926     (33.69)     (48.01)           -        (28.41)     (83.03)     (33.83)     (28.45)     (26.26)     (19.73)
0.0975     (33.94)     (47.50)           -        (28.96)     (85.01)     (33.49)     (28.18)     (26.07)     (19.50)
0.1024     (34.12)     (46.98)           -        (29.48)     (86.80)     (33.13)     (27.89)     (25.87)     (19.25)
0.1073     (34.25)     (46.43)           -        (29.96)     (88.42)     (32.76)     (27.60)     (25.66)     (18.99)
0.1121     (34.33)     (45.88)           -        (30.40)     (89.87)     (32.39)     (27.30)     (25.45)     (18.71)
0.1170     (34.37)     (45.33)           -        (30.81)     (91.18)     (32.02)     (27.01)     (25.24)     (18.44)
60Appendix Table B17.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Durum Fixed
Price Contract with AOG by Level of Discount for AOG Provisions ($/a)















0 67.38 62.39 57.40 52.41 47.42
0.0049 62.90 57.92 52.93 47.94 42.95
0.0098 58.82 53.83 48.85 43.86 38.87
0.0146 55.06 50.08 45.10 40.11 35.13
0.0195 51.59 46.61 41.63 36.65 31.67
0.0244 48.38 43.40 38.42 33.44 28.46
0.0293 45.40 40.42 35.45 30.47 25.50
0.0341 42.64 37.67 32.69 27.72 22.74
0.0390 40.08 35.11 30.14 25.16 20.19
0.0439 37.69 32.73 27.76 22.79 17.82
0.0488 35.48 30.51 25.55 20.58 15.61
0.0536 33.41 28.45 23.48 18.52 13.55
0.0585 31.48 26.52 21.56 16.59 11.63
0.0634 29.67 24.71 19.75 14.79 9.82
0.0683 27.98 23.02 18.06 13.09 8.13
0.0731 26.38 21.42 16.46 11.50 6.54
0.0780 24.87 19.91 14.96 9.99 5.03
0.0829 23.44 18.49 13.53 8.57 3.61
0.0878 22.09 17.14 12.18 7.22 2.26
0.0926 20.81 15.85 10.90 5.94 0.97
0.0975 19.58 14.63 9.67 4.71 (0.25)
0.1024 18.41 13.46 8.51 3.55 (1.42)
0.1073 17.30 12.35 7.39 2.43 (2.53)
0.1121 16.23 11.28 6.32 1.36 (3.60)
0.1170 15.21 10.26 5.30 0.34 (4.62)
61Appendix Table B18.  Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged by Risk Attitude for
Durum Fixed Price Contract with AOG by Level of Discount for AOG Provisions
($/a)















0     (12.54)     (17.53)     (22.52)     (27.51)     (32.51)
0.0049     (14.29)     (19.28)     (24.27)     (29.26)     (34.25)
0.0098     (15.88)     (20.86)     (25.85)     (30.83)     (35.82)
0.0146     (17.32)     (22.30)     (27.28)     (32.27)     (37.25)
0.0195     (18.62)     (23.60)     (28.58)     (33.56)     (38.54)
0.0244     (19.79)     (24.77)     (29.75)     (34.73)     (39.71)
0.0293     (20.84)     (25.82)     (30.79)     (35.77)     (40.75)
0.0341     (21.77)     (26.75)     (31.72)     (36.69)     (41.67)
0.0390     (22.60)     (27.57)     (32.54)     (37.51)     (42.49)
0.0439     (23.33)     (28.29)     (33.26)     (38.23)     (43.20)
0.0488     (23.97)     (28.93)     (33.90)     (38.87)     (43.84)
0.0536     (24.53)     (29.49)     (34.46)     (39.42)     (44.39)
0.0585     (25.02)     (29.99)     (34.95)     (39.91)     (44.88)
0.0634     (25.46)     (30.42)     (35.38)     (40.35)     (45.31)
0.0683     (25.85)     (30.81)     (35.77)     (40.73)     (45.70)
0.0731     (26.20)     (31.16)     (36.12)     (41.08)     (46.04)
0.0780     (26.52)     (31.47)     (36.43)     (41.39)     (46.36)
0.0829     (26.80)     (31.76)     (36.72)     (41.68)     (46.64)
0.0878     (27.07)     (32.02)     (36.98)     (41.94)     (46.90)
0.0926     (27.31)     (32.26)     (37.22)     (42.18)     (47.14)
0.0975     (27.53)     (32.49)     (37.44)     (42.40)     (47.37)
0.1024     (27.75)     (32.70)     (37.65)     (42.61)     (47.58)
0.1073     (27.95)     (32.90)     (37.86)     (42.81)     (47.78)
0.1121     (28.14)     (33.09)     (38.05)     (43.01)     (47.97)
0.1170     (28.32)     (33.27)     (38.23)     (43.19)     (48.15)
62Appendix Table B19.  Certainty Equivalents by Risk Attitude for Contract



















0 79.92 62.69 79.92 67.38 67.38 68.75 71.55 64.11 67.38
0.0049 73.83 51.53 77.19 62.90 61.12 58.72 61.91 58.78 62.90
0.0098 68.16 43.23 74.70 58.82 55.27 51.31 54.77 54.03 58.82
0.0146 62.85 36.61 72.38 55.06 49.75 45.40 49.07 49.74 55.06
0.0195 57.83 31.11 70.21 51.59 44.52 40.47 44.30 45.85 51.59
0.0244 53.09 26.40 68.17 48.38 39.57 36.22 40.17 42.31 48.38
0.0293 48.59 22.31 66.24 45.40 34.87 32.48 36.53 39.07 45.40
0.0341 44.34 18.70 64.41 42.64 30.41 29.16 33.28 36.10 42.64
0.0390 40.31 15.50 62.68 40.08 26.19 26.18 30.35 33.38 40.08
0.0439 36.51 12.64 61.02 37.69 22.19 23.47 27.68 30.86 37.69
0.0488 32.93 10.06 59.44 35.48 18.41 21.02 25.25 28.54 35.48
0.0536 29.57 7.73 57.94 33.41 14.84 18.77 23.02 26.39 33.41
0.0585 26.40 5.61 56.51 31.48 11.47 16.70 20.96 24.39 31.48
0.0634 23.43 3.68 55.14 29.67 8.29 14.79 19.05 22.53 29.67
0.0683 20.65 1.90 53.83 27.98 5.30 13.02 17.27 20.79 27.98
0.0731 18.04 0.27 52.58 26.38 2.47 11.37 15.61 19.15 26.38
0.0780 15.60 (1.24) 51.39 24.87 (0.20) 9.83 14.06 17.62 24.87
0.0829 13.31 (2.64) 50.25 23.44 (2.72) 8.39 12.60 16.16 23.44
0.0878 11.17 (3.94) 49.16 22.09 (5.10) 7.03 11.22 14.79 22.09
0.0926 9.16 (5.16) 48.11 20.81 (7.35) 5.76 9.92 13.49 20.81
0.0975 7.27 (6.30) 47.12 19.58 (9.49) 4.55 8.69 12.25 19.58
0.1024 5.49 (7.36) 46.16 18.41 (11.51) 3.41 7.52 11.07 18.41
0.1073 3.81 (8.37) 45.25 17.30 (13.43) 2.32 6.40 9.94 17.30
0.1121 2.23 (9.32) 44.37 16.23 (15.25) 1.29 5.34 8.86 16.23
0.1170 0.74 (10.21) 43.53 15.21 (16.98) 0.30 4.32 7.82 15.21
63Appendix Table B20.  Risk Premiums Relative to HRS Hedged by Risk Attitude for



















0        0.00      (17.24)           -        (12.54)     (12.54)     (11.17)       (8.37)     (15.81)     (12.54)
0.0049       (3.36)     (25.66)           -        (14.29)     (16.07)     (18.47)     (15.29)     (18.41)     (14.29)
0.0098       (6.53)     (31.47)           -        (15.88)     (19.43)     (23.39)     (19.92)     (20.67)     (15.88)
0.0146       (9.53)     (35.77)           -        (17.32)     (22.63)     (26.98)     (23.30)     (22.64)     (17.32)
0.0195     (12.38)     (39.11)           -        (18.62)     (25.69)     (29.74)     (25.91)     (24.36)     (18.62)
0.0244     (15.08)     (41.77)           -        (19.79)     (28.60)     (31.95)     (28.00)     (25.86)     (19.79)
0.0293     (17.65)     (43.94)           -        (20.84)     (31.37)     (33.76)     (29.71)     (27.17)     (20.84)
0.0341     (20.08)     (45.71)           -        (21.77)     (34.00)     (35.25)     (31.14)     (28.31)     (21.77)
0.0390     (22.36)     (47.17)           -        (22.60)     (36.49)     (36.50)     (32.33)     (29.30)     (22.60)
0.0439     (24.51)     (48.38)           -        (23.33)     (38.83)     (37.55)     (33.34)     (30.16)     (23.33)
0.0488     (26.51)     (49.38)           -        (23.97)     (41.03)     (38.43)     (34.19)     (30.90)     (23.97)
0.0536     (28.38)     (50.21)           -        (24.53)     (43.10)     (39.17)     (34.92)     (31.55)     (24.53)
0.0585     (30.11)     (50.89)           -        (25.02)     (45.03)     (39.81)     (35.55)     (32.11)     (25.02)
0.0634     (31.70)     (51.46)           -        (25.46)     (46.84)     (40.35)     (36.09)     (32.61)     (25.46)
0.0683     (33.18)     (51.92)           -        (25.85)     (48.53)     (40.81)     (36.56)     (33.04)     (25.85)
0.0731     (34.54)     (52.31)           -        (26.20)     (50.11)     (41.21)     (36.97)     (33.43)     (26.20)
0.0780     (35.78)     (52.63)           -        (26.52)     (51.59)     (41.56)     (37.33)     (33.77)     (26.52)
0.0829     (36.93)     (52.89)           -        (26.80)     (52.97)     (41.86)     (37.65)     (34.08)     (26.80)
0.0878     (37.99)     (53.10)           -        (27.07)     (54.26)     (42.12)     (37.93)     (34.37)     (27.07)
0.0926     (38.96)     (53.27)           -        (27.31)     (55.47)     (42.36)     (38.19)     (34.63)     (27.31)
0.0975     (39.85)     (53.41)           -        (27.53)     (56.60)     (42.56)     (38.43)     (34.87)     (27.53)
0.1024     (40.67)     (53.52)           -        (27.75)     (57.67)     (42.75)     (38.64)     (35.09)     (27.75)
0.1073     (41.43)     (53.61)           -        (27.95)     (58.67)     (42.92)     (38.84)     (35.31)     (27.95)
0.1121     (42.13)     (53.68)           -        (28.14)     (59.61)     (43.08)     (39.03)     (35.51)     (28.14)
0.1170     (42.78)     (53.74)           -        (28.32)     (60.50)     (43.22)     (39.21)     (35.70)     (28.32)
64